This book takes a fresh look at the undersea war as a whole and all the complex factors bearing on the campaign, only one of which was convoy. Its analysis is original, and its conclusions thought-provoking – an important contribution to the naval history of the Great War.

In February 1917, German U-boats launched a savage unrestricted campaign against both Allied and neutral shipping. At its peak in April, 860,000 tons of Allied merchant shipping was sunk. Britain's supremacy at sea was being severely challenged and with it the chances of victory in the wider war. Taking up the challenge was Britain's new First Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, until the previous December C-in-C of the Grand Fleet - famously described by Churchill as the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon. The battle he now faced was equally critical, although the timeline of defeat was a matter of days rather than hours. Britain's food stocks were dangerously low with wheat reserves down to six weeks and sugar to only two, while wide-scale shortages were crippling the industrial economy. Clearly, a radical new approach to anti-submarine warfare was called for, and Convoy was the leading contender. There were many objections to protecting shipping in this way, some ideological but most practical - a workable system, for example, effectively required state control of both shipping and distribution networks, something inconceivable in normal circumstances. However, Convoy had powerful advocates, including the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, who later claimed he had personally forced its adoption on a reluctant Admiralty. This self-serving political myth cast Jellicoe as an opponent of Convoy. Nothing could be further from the truth. As both Jellicoe and Rear Admiral William Sims understood, the key requirement was a rapid increase in the number of destroyers for escort duties. America provided them, the first arriving in Queenstown, Ireland on 4 May and by June 46 were operating in European waters. This was the first step in an Anglo-American campaign that gradually brought the U-boat threat under control and led to its ultimate defeat. Jellicoe's War: The U-boat Threat in World War One and the Question of Convoy is a fresh look at the undersea war as a whole and all the complex factors bearing on the campaign, only one of which was convoy. Its analysis is original, and its conclusions thought provoking - an important contribution to the naval history of the Great War.

"In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan. S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany's 'asymmetric' challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain's naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular. The Royal Navy's obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be key to the solution of the U-boat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat. Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue ... Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflections on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it."--Foreword.

The Q-ship, an ordinary merchant vessel with concealed guns, came into its own during the First World War, when the Royal Navy to trap and destroy German U-boats. Deborah Lake uses a wide range of primary and secondary source material drawn from archives in the UK, Germany and the USA to tell the compelling story of the Q-ships and their U-boat adversaries. The Q-ship operations themselves will be covered by following the careers of the eight men who won the Victoria Cross on Special Service Operations; and by accounts of German U-boat crews being on the receiving end. No book on Q-ships can avoid the Baralong incident in which a Q-ship's crew allegedly executed the survivors of the German submarine U-27, on 19 August 1915. In a subsequent encounter with U-41, more British atrocities were alleged by the only two German survivors. Revealing extracts from the diary of a Royal Marine who served on board the Baralong are reproduced in the book together with other first-hand accounts. With charge and counter-charge, this incident provides a fascinating story.

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond was "a unique phenomenon in the Victorian-Edwardian navy—a professionally competent and successful officer who was also an intellectual," writes the author. "This was enough to ensure that his progress would be stormy.'' This thoroughly documented biographical study of Richmond's professional career reveals a fully experienced, clear-thinking officer with a profound understanding of naval history, "a restless and uncompromising personality," and a passionate concern with naval strategy, the art of war, and the most effective training programme for officers. Richmond persistently challenged the accepted practices and prejudices of the naval profession. He and his small group of disciples, the "Young Turks," found themselves in the thick of the most crucial controversies in the British Navy. In spite of frequent official displeasure, however, Richmond became an influential naval historian and educator, responsible for the creation of the modern naval staff and the Imperial Defence College. The volume rests on extensive research in the official records and the private papers of Richmond and his close associates. It will interest not only naval historians, but also those with a general interest in the impact of one man's thought and actions on Britain's defence policy and the outcome of two World Wars.

In 'The Crisis of the Naval War in WW1' by John Rushworth Jellicoe, readers are presented with a comprehensive analysis of the challenges faced by the naval forces during World War I. Jellicoe delves into the intricate strategies, naval technologies, and key battles that shaped the course of the war, providing a scholarly account of this pivotal period in history. Written in a precise and informative style, the book offers readers a detailed understanding of the naval aspects of WWI, highlighting the critical role played by navies in the conflict. John Rushworth Jellicoe, a highly esteemed naval officer and historian, draws upon his extensive experience and knowledge to offer insights into the complexities of naval warfare. His authoritative voice and in-depth research make this book a valuable resource for anyone interested in military history or the events of WWI. Jellicoe's expertise in the subject matter lends credibility to the text, making it a must-read for scholars and enthusiasts alike. I highly recommend 'The Crisis of the Naval War in WW1' to readers seeking a detailed and well-researched account of the naval operations during World War I. Jellicoe's meticulous analysis and engaging narrative make this book a compelling read for those interested in military history and the impact of naval power on global conflicts.