The true story of the Southern Confederacy lies in the letters, speeches, and State papers of its leaders; and its best justification will come after such historical materials have been made accessible to the truth-loving historian of the future. The private and public papers of such Southern leaders as Calhoun, Davis, and Lee will reveal, as nothing else can, the principles for which they contended, and give to posterity the true estimate of their lives and deeds. -- Introduction.

The true story of the Southern Confederacy lies in the letters, speeches, and State papers of its leaders; and its best justification will come after such historical materials have been made accessible to the truth-loving historian of the future. The private and public papers of such Southern leaders as Calhoun, Davis, and Lee will reveal, as nothing else can, the principles for which they contended, and give to posterity the true estimate of their lives and deeds. -- Introduction.

Volume 8 of The Papers of Jefferson Davis brings the Confederate president to the second year of the War Between the States and shows that during 1862 Davis was almost completely overwhelmed by military matters. Indeed, early that year, in an address to the Confederate Congress, he admitted that in trying to defend every part of its far-flung territory, the “Government had attempted more than it had power successfully to achieve.” During 1862, Judah P. Benjamin was replaced as secretary of war by George W. Randolph, who was then succeeded by James A. Seddon. As the year advanced, Davis’ relationships with certain key generals continued to sour. Chief among them were P.G.T. Beauregard, who was finally removed from his last significant command, and Joseph E. Johnston, whose fall from grace precipitated Robert E. Lee’s rise to influence as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee proved to be as adept in communicating and coordinating plans with the president as Johnston had been inept. At the inconclusive Battle of Shiloh, Davis lost Albert Sidney Johnston, a trusted friend and the general he had most admired. Like Shiloh, many other campaigns of 1862 ended in stalemate and withdrawal, including Henry H. Sibley’s New Mexico campaign, Braxton Bragg’s Kentucky campaign, Earl Van Dorn’s battle at Elkhorn Tavern, and the Confederacy’s greatest gamble—Lee’s Invasion of Maryland. Correspondence with Davis’ brother, Joseph E. Davis, reveals the ever-worsening situation in Mississippi. The Federal occupation of New Orleans, the fall of new Madrid and Island No. 10, and Grants repeated attempts to capture Vicksburg heightened anxiety about the area and persuaded the president to tour the western theater in December. Because the Union’s springtime invasion of Richmond prompted Davis to send his wife and children away, Volume 8 contains an unusually rich collection of letters exchanged during their separation. This correspondence offers a rare glimpse into the minds and hearts of Davis and his wife. Altogether, more than 2,000 documents, many never before published, are included in Volume 8; 133 are printed in full. Culled from fifty-nine repositories, twenty-one private collections, and numerous printed sources, they reveal that despite the many setbacks he suffered in 1862, Davis maintained a deep devotion to duty and an unbending will to win.

'Those interested in the nature of American nationalism will find much food for thought in this accomplished discussion of the way Southerners rejected their American identities during the Civil War and developed a sense of themselves as Confederates.'' Foreign Affairs Historians often assert that Confederate nationalism had its origins in pre-Civil War sectional conflict with the North, reached its apex at the start of the war, and then dropped off quickly after the end of hostilities. Anne Sarah Rubin argues instead that white Southerners did not actually begin to formulate a national identity until it became evident that the Confederacy was destined to fight a lengthy war against the Union. She also demonstrates that an attachment to a symbolic or sentimental Confederacy existed independent of the political Confederacy and was therefore able to persist well after the collapse of the Confederate state. White Southerners redefined symbols and figures of the failed state as emotional touchstones and political rallying points in the struggle to retain local (and racial) control, Rubin argues, even as former Confederates took the loyalty oath and applied for pardons in droves.