Japanese leaders and often the media too have substituted symbols for strategy in dealing with Asia. This comprehensive review of four periods over twenty years exposes the strategic gap in viewing individually and collectively China, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Russia, Central Asia, and regionalism.

This book traces the development of Chinese thinking over four periods from the 1980s on and covers strategies toward: Russia and Central Asia, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Southeast and South Asia, and regionalism. It compares strategic thinking, arguing that the level was lowest under Jiang Zemin and highest under Hu Jintao. While pinpointing many mistaken assumptions, it credits China with overall successes and concludes that China stands at a crossroads. Deng Xiaoping’s legacy about patiently biding its time may be replaced by growing assertiveness, which was difficult to suppress earlier and now is emboldened by China’s rapid rise.

At the crossroads of Northeast Asia, South Korea provides a critical vantage point for viewing changes in the region. This comprehensive review of the past quarter century covers its strategic thinking in regard to China, Japan, Russia, regionalism, and reunification.

This book traces the development of Chinese thinking over four periods from the 1980s on and covers strategies toward: Russia and Central Asia, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Southeast and South Asia, and regionalism. It compares strategic thinking, arguing that the level was lowest under Jiang Zemin and highest under Hu Jintao.

The book explains the Putin era's ambivalent approach to Asia and finds lessons from earlier approaches worthy of further attention. The overview compares how strategic thinking evolved, while reflecting on factors that shaped it.

"The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere offers a lucid, dynamic, and highly readable history of Japan's attempt to usher in a new order in Asia during World War II." ― Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review In The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Jeremy A. Yellen exposes the history, politics, and intrigue that characterized the era when Japan's "total empire" met the total war of World War II. He illuminates the ways in which the imperial center and its individual colonies understood the concept of the Sphere, offering two sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, and always intertwined visions—one from Japan, the other from Burma and the Philippines. Yellen argues that, from 1940 to 1945, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere epitomized two concurrent wars for Asia's future: the first was for a new type of empire in Asia, and the second was a political war, waged by nationalist elites in the colonial capitals of Rangoon and Manila. Exploring Japanese visions for international order in the face of an ever-changing geopolitical situation, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere explores wartime Japan's desire to shape and control its imperial future while its colonies attempted to do the same. At Japan's zenith as an imperial power, the Sphere represented a plan for regional domination; by the end of the war, it had been recast as the epitome of cooperative internationalism. In the end, the Sphere could not survive wartime defeat, and Yellen's lucidly written account reveals much about the desires of Japan as an imperial and colonial power, as well as the ways in which the subdued colonies in Burma and the Philippines jockeyed for agency and a say in the future of the region.

Soon after the American Revolution, ?certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.