Featuring evocative artwork plates and carefully selected photographs, this book assesses the US Marines and Japanese troops who contested the islands of Tarawa, Roi-Namur, and Eniwetok during 1943–44. On November 20, 1943, amphibious vehicles carrying Marines of the 2d Marine Division reached the shores of Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll, defended by a determined Japanese garrison that would fight to the last man. This began a test by combat of over two decades of US studies, analyses, and planning for capturing and defending naval bases in Micronesia. The Tarawa assault was followed in February 1944 by the rapid capture of the Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands. In these battles US Marines fought a mix of Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army ground units. All but a handful of the defenders, whether they were organized ground combat troops or infantry improvised from aviators and service troops, were determined to die for the Emperor while killing as many of the enemy as possible. In this study, Gregg Adams shows how the US Marine Corps and US Navy drew upon these pivotal actions to improve their tactics, organization, and equipment for the next round of amphibious operations. He also explains how their Japanese opponents – realizing that isolated island garrisons were doomed to destruction or isolation if the Imperial Japanese Navy could not defeat the US Navy at sea – moved from seeking to repel an invasion to one inflicting maximum American casualties through prolonged defensive fighting.

Featuring evocative artwork plates and carefully selected photographs, this book assesses the US Marines and Japanese troops who contested the islands of Tarawa, Roi-Namur, and Eniwetok during 1943–44. On November 20, 1943, amphibious vehicles carrying Marines of the 2d Marine Division reached the shores of Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll, defended by a determined Japanese garrison that would fight to the last man. This began a test by combat of over two decades of US studies, analyses, and planning for capturing and defending naval bases in Micronesia. The Tarawa assault was followed in February 1944 by the rapid capture of the Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands. In these battles US Marines fought a mix of Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army ground units. All but a handful of the defenders, whether they were organized ground combat troops or infantry improvised from aviators and service troops, were determined to die for the Emperor while killing as many of the enemy as possible. In this study, Gregg Adams shows how the US Marine Corps and US Navy drew upon these pivotal actions to improve their tactics, organization, and equipment for the next round of amphibious operations. He also explains how their Japanese opponents – realizing that isolated island garrisons were doomed to destruction or isolation if the Imperial Japanese Navy could not defeat the US Navy at sea – moved from seeking to repel an invasion to one inflicting maximum American casualties through prolonged defensive fighting.

This absorbing study pits US Army National Guardsmen against Japanese soldiers in the uniquely hostile setting of the New Guinea campaign in World War II. When Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, New Guinea – the world's second-largest island – was administered partly by Australia and partly by the Dutch East Indies. The New Guinea campaign (January 1942–August 1945) saw Japanese forces invade the island, rapidly capturing the key port of Rabaul and threatening Port Moresby, while US forces joined the defenders in increasing numbers. The uniquely demanding environment, and the savage nature of the fighting, meant that the campaign was among the most arduous of World War II for both sides. In this study, the Japanese forces and their US Army opponents, many of whom were National Guard units, are assessed and compared, with particular attention paid to combat doctrine, weaponry, tactics, logistics, leadership, and communications in the challenging setting of New Guinea. The role of US Army National Guard units and their Japanese opponents in three important battles are examined, namely Buna–Gona (November 1942–January 1943), Biak Island (May–August 1944) and the Driniumor River (July–August 1944).

The US armed forces were responsible for many tactical innovations during the years 1941–45, but in no field was US mastery more complete than amphibious warfare. In the vast, almost empty battlefield of the Pacific the US Navy and Marine Corps were obliged to develop every aspect of the amphibious assault landing in painstaking detail, from the design of many new types of vessel, down to the tactics of the rifle platoon hitting the beach, and the logistic system without which they could not have fought their way inland. This fascinating study offers a clear, succinct explanation of every phase of these operations as they evolved during the war years, illustrated with detailed color plates and photographs.

Featuring specially commissioned artwork and careful analysis, this volume investigates the fighting between US Marines and their German opponents during the battle for Belleau Wood in June 1918.

Israel seized the strategically critical Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 Six Day War in an audacious and determined operation, yet when the Yom Kippur War broke out the Israeli military were exposed by the effectiveness of the newly confident and dangerous Syrian army. In the Golan only luck, herculean Israeli efforts and tactical misjudgements by the Syrians were to allow the Israelis to maintain control. In this book, three pivotal encounters in the Golan are assessed, supported by artwork, maps and photographs, tracking how both sides' forces evolved over the period.