The Japanese conquest of the Pacific comprised of a complex series of widely scattered operations; their intent was to neutralize American, Commonwealth, and Dutch forces, seize regions rich in economic resources, and secure an outer defense line for their empire. Although their conquest was successful, the forces deployed from Japan and China were not always ideally trained, equipped and armed. The South Seas and tropics proved challenging to these soldiers who were used to milder climates, and they were a less lethal enemy on the Chinese mainland. This book examines the overall structure of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the forces in existence at the beginning of World War II and the organization of the forces committed to the conquest of the Pacific.

The 1941 Japanese Pacific onslaught saw the defeat of Allied forces on all fronts, with the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and Commonwealth possessions falling under their control. During 1942-43, the Japanese consolidated their gains and redeployed forces in an attempt to break the Southern Lifeline between America and Australia. These plans were affected by the defeat at Midway, which forced the Japanese onto the defensive. This book examines Japanese forces employed in the follow-on conquests of 1942-43, and describes how unit organization, weaponry, and equipment were found lacking in the harsh environment of the Solomon Islands and on New Guinea.

Among the major powers of World War II, the uniforms and equipment of the Japanese army have received the least coverage. This new, detailed volume presents the subject with a superb collection of actual vintage items, and rarely seen World War II era photographs. Among the subjects covered are: the Imperial Japanese army uniform series; undergarments; footwear; headwear; personal field equipment; extreme climate uniforms; work and specialty uniforms; soldier's personal items; and firearms. A short chapter examines reproductions.

The German offensives which crushed Poland in 1939 and swallowed most of Western Europe in less than two months in 1940 have been well documented and heavily studied, however, the overall picture of the remarkable Japanese offensive land campaign in 1941–42 has received less attention. In this fascinating new book, Bill Yenne documents the years when the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was conducting its equally unstoppable ground campaign in the Far East, and unlike other books on this subject, he studies the campaign from the Japanese point of view. He reveals how the IJA were able to conquer huge swathes of Southeast Asia in a little over eight weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Using first-hand accounts from Japanese sources, Yenne reveals the tactics and mindset of the IJA during their offensive, detailing the capturing of Manila, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies. Exploring the infrastructure and technical challenges of waging war across such a huge area, Yenne delves into the hardships that faced individual Japanese soldiers in theatre and explains how the Japanese were able to remain undefeated and establish the aura of invincibility that marked their campaign between 1941–42.

For the first time in English, this book offers a concise but fact-packed account of the organization, equipment, and all operations of Japan's small but elite wartime parachute forces. Correcting and amplifying previous accounts based on wartime intelligence, it traces the Imperial Army's Raiding Regiments and the Imperial Navy's parachute-trained Yokosuka 1st & 3rd Special Naval Landing Forces from the first trials units, through their successful assaults in early 1942, to the last desperate battles and raids of 1944–45. Thetext is illustrated with rare photographs, and meticulouslyreconstructed color artworkof the men and their gear.

Popular impressions of the imperial Japanese army still promote images of suicidal banzai charges and fanatical leaders blindly devoted to their emperor. Edward Drea looks well past those stereotypes to unfold the more complex story of how that army came to power and extended its influence at home and abroad to become one of the world's dominant fighting forces. This first comprehensive English-language history of the Japanese army traces its origins, evolution, and impact as an engine of the country's regional and global ambitions and as a catalyst for the militarization of the Japanese homeland from mid-nineteenth-century incursions through the end of World War II. Demonstrating his mastery of Japanese-language sources, Drea explains how the Japanese style of warfare, burnished by samurai legends, shaped the army, narrowed its options, influenced its decisions, and made it the institution that conquered most of Asia. He also tells how the army's intellectual foundations shifted as it reinvented itself to fulfill the changing imperatives of Japanese society-and how the army in turn decisively shaped the nation's political, social, cultural, and strategic course. Drea recounts how Japan devoted an inordinate amount of its treasury toward modernizing, professionalizing, and training its army-which grew larger, more powerful, and politically more influential with each passing decade. Along the way, it produced an efficient military schooling system, a well-organized active duty and reserve force, a professional officer corps that thought in terms of regional threat, and well-trained soldiers armed with appropriate weapons. Encompassing doctrine, strategy, weaponry, and civil-military relations, Drea's expert study also captures the dominant personalities who shaped the imperial army, from Yamagata Aritomo, an incisive geopolitical strategist, to Anami Korechika, who exhorted the troops to fight to the death during the final days of World War II. Summing up, Drea also suggests that an army that places itself above its nation's interests is doomed to failure.

In the eyes of history, Japanese intelligence in World War II has fared very poorly. However, these historians have most often concentrated on the later years of the war, when Japan was fighting a multi-front war against numerous opponents. In this groundbreaking new study, Japanese scholar Ken Kotani re-examines the Japanese Intelligence department, beginning with the early phase of the war. He points out that without the intelligence gathered by the Japanese Army and Navy they would have been unable to achieve their long string of victories against the forces of Russia, China, and Great Britain. Notable in these early campaigns were the successful strikes against both Singapore and Pearl Harbor. Yet as these victories expanded the sphere of Japanese control, they also made it harder for the intelligence services to gather accurate information about their growing list of adversaries. At the battle of Midway in 1942, Japanese intelligence suffered its worst mishap when the Americans broke their code and tricked the Japanese into revealing the target of their attack. It was a mistake from which they would never recover. As the military might of Japan was forced to retreat and her forces deteriorated, so too did her intelligence services.