Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement. From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general.

A Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press publication Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, the latest edition of this classic work analyzes how each U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. There have been remarkable successes—such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—frustrating failures, and dangerous wars along the way. This book helps to situate the current Middle East crisis in historical context and point to some possible ways out of the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. Quandt suggests a clear U.S. commitment to a two-state solution—one that would assure Israel of security and peace within the 1967 treaty-established borders, offer the Palestinians an early end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and most of the West Bank, and establish both a Jewish and Arab Jerusalem. Written especially for classroom use, Peace Process is also an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone interested in this vital region of the world. Praise for previous editions of Peace Process “Clearly written, carefully balanced and comprehensive in scope . . . should prove invaluable to all serious students of American foreign policy.”—New York Times Book Review “A major work, whether judged by the standards of classical diplomatic history or modern political science.”—Foreign Affairs “Provides fresh insights into the complexities of creating the process and defining the substance of American foreign policymaking.”—Survival “While objective to a fault, Quandt writes with an insider's knowledge of policymaking and decisions taken at the highest levels of government.”—Middle East Policy “Both a history and analysis of an evolving relationship between Israel and its Arab opponents.”—Choice “A major contribution to understanding the complexity of U.S. presidents’ handling of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict. It should be compulsory reading for anyone studying the Middle East conflict, peacemaking and conflict resolution.”—Journal of Peace Research

One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.

For seventy years Israel has existed as a state, and for forty years it has honored a peace treaty with Egypt that is widely viewed as a triumph of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Yet the Palestinians - the would-be beneficiaries of a vision for a comprehensive regional settlement that led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 - remain stateless to this day. How and why Palestinian statelessness persists are the central questions of Seth Anziska's groundbreaking book, which explores the complex legacy of the agreement brokered by President Jimmy Carter. Based on newly declassified international sources, Preventing Palestine charts the emergence of the Middle East peace process, including the establishment of a separate track to deal with the issue of Palestine. At the very start of this process, Anziska argues, Egyptian-Israeli peace came at the expense of the sovereignty of the Palestinians, whose aspirations for a homeland alongside Israel faced crippling challenges. With the introduction of the idea of restrictive autonomy, Israeli settlement expansion, and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the chances for Palestinian statehood narrowed even further. The first Intifada in 1987 and the end of the Cold War brought new opportunities for a Palestinian state, but many players, refusing to see Palestinians as a nation or a people, continued to steer international diplomacy away from their cause.

Abstract:

Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement. From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general.