Israel, The Middle East and the Great Powers presents the Israel-Arab conflict to the general public in a uniquely comprehensive and interdisciplinary format. Its form and content reflect the most serious efforts of Israel's intellectual community to analyze the conflict situation in which they live, objectively and honestly. The book argues that recent events have reduced the U.S. role, and changed the policy parameters in the region. A broad cross-section of Israel's foremost orientalists, historians, juridicists and political scientists have contributed a selection of articles and lexicons which embody the essential aspects of the conflict in its broadest sense. Each key element is analyzed within a number of categories: the ideological-theological plane (Judaism, Zionism, the Holocaust, Jerusalem and the three monotheistic religions); the Palestinian sphere (PLO ideology, Jordon and the Judea & Samaria Region, the PLO and the war in lebanon); the superpowers and the wider region (Iran-Iraq, the Islamic resurgence, oil, the Soviet Union and the Middle East, the United States and Israel), etc. Detailed lexicons offer concise factual breakdowns of both the Middle East (inter-Arab aspects, key Arab countries, conventional and nuclear Arab armaments) and the Arab-Israel context (chronology of the conflict, key events and personalities in Zionism, UN involvement, international legal aspects).

This edited volume re-assesses the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and key regional players in waging and halting conflict in the Middle East between 1967 and 1973. These were pivotal years in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the effects still very much in evidence today. In addition to addressing established debates, the book opens up new areas of controversy, in particular concerning the inter-war years and the so-called ‘War of Attrition’, and underlines the risks both Moscow and Washington were prepared to run in supporting their regional clients. The engagement of Soviet forces in the air defence of Egypt heightened the danger of escalation and made this one of the hottest regional conflicts of the Cold War era. Against this Cold War backdrop, the motives of both Israel and the Arab states in waging full-scale and lower-intensity conflict are illuminated. The overall goal of this work is to re-assess the relationship between the Cold War and regional conflict in shaping the events of this pivotal period in the Middle East. The Cold War in the Middle East will be of much interest to students of Cold War studies, Middle Eastern history, strategic studies and international history.

Israel's relations with each of the superpowers was determined by global factors. The dilemma facing Israel was how to reconcile its interests with those of the United States, having failed to do so with the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the cold war the United States considered Israel a burden rather than an asset and had to accommodate support for Israel with keeping the Arab states within the western orbit. Partisan policy could have dealt a mortal blow to the fundamental assumption of American global strategy. Namely that the Middle East should not be allowed to become a cold war arena. The book shows how the fledgling state of Israel had to manoeuvre between the superpowers to survive.

The Middle Eastern problem is suffused with emotion and ignorance. It is both good and important to have Cobban's perceptive and cool dissection of a truly complex issue. Zbigniew Brezezinski Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies Former National Security Adviser Middle East analyst Cobban's 'historical case study of how things were in the Israel-Syria theater during the years 1978-1989' was largely completed before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but the events of the past year make this book more, rather than less, relevant. . . . Cobban's focus, then, on these two heavily armed nations and their superpower relationships could hardly be more timely. Booklist In the coalition war against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, the participation of Syria in the U.S.-led coalition and the restraint of Israel were important elements in the quick and successful conclusion of the war. The United States' diplomatic and military resolve, as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the international arena, helped put Syria and Israel on the same side in this effort. This was a surprising development in light of the strained state of Syrian-Israeli relations in the years leading up to 1990. Helena Cobban investigates the evolution of the military balance between Israel and Syria from 1978 through 1990, focusing on the effects of the close strategic ties that developed between these states and their respective superpower partners. The fighting in Lebanon in 1982 is closely examined, since it proved to be a key turning point for Israel and Syria--and for the superpowers parrying for influence in the Middle East region. After an up-to-the-minute preface analyzing the effects of the Persian Gulf War on the Syrian-Israeli relationship, Cobban explores the immunity this area showed in the late 1980s to diplomatic efforts that were resolving regional conflicts elsewhere in the world, as well as the surprising overall stability of this theatre even in the absence of effective diplomacy. The arsenals of Israel and Syria, now the preeminent military powers in the Middle East after the defanging of Iraq, are still formidable. Cobban presents a formula for careful diplomacy in the 1990s that could lead to a lasting peace. This book is essential reading for political scientists, students of military engagements, and others who have an interest in the worldwide consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This book, first published in 1991, examines in detail superpower-client relations in the Middle East. The Middle East, with its protracted and seemingly insoluble conflict and complex patterns of loyalty and hostility, is the ideal setting for the study of such relationships. Using the USSR and Syria, and the USA and Israel as case studies, this book illuminates the extent of superpower influence on client states but also the real constraints on their exercise of that influence. In analysing specific contexts over this period, the authors advance that tension between goals and constraints often favours the client state and that superpower relations are not those of dominance and subordination but bargaining relations in which clients have great leverage.