States that withdraw from the international system provide insight into an unexplored area of international relations in terms of rationality, self-interest, power politics, cooperation and alliances. Indeed, isolationism in an interdependent state system goes against the logic of modern society and state systems. Using historical, comparative and inductive analysis, Helga Turku explains why states may choose to isolate themselves both domestically and internationally, using comparative historical analysis to flesh out isolationism as a concept and in practice. The book examines extreme forms of self-imposed domestic and international isolation in an interdependent international system, noting the effects on both the immediate interests of a ruling regime and the long-term national interests of the state and the populace.

States that withdraw from the international system provide insight into an unexplored area of international relations in terms of rationality, self-interest, power politics, cooperation and alliances. Indeed, isolationism in an interdependent state system goes against the logic of modern society and state systems. Using historical, comparative and inductive analysis, Helga Turku explains why states may choose to isolate themselves both domestically and internationally, using comparative historical analysis to flesh out isolationism as a concept and in practice. The book examines extreme forms of self-imposed domestic and international isolation in an interdependent international system, noting the effects on both the immediate interests of a ruling regime and the long-term national interests of the state and the populace.

"The United States is in the midst of a bruising debate about its role in the world. Not since the interwar era have Americans been so divided over the scope and nature of their engagement abroad. President Donald Trump's America First approach to foreign policy certainly amplified the controversy. His isolationist, unilateralist, protectionist, and anti-immigrant proclivities marked a sharp break with the brand of internationalism that the country had embraced since World War II. But Trump's election was a symptom as much as a cause of the nation's rethink of its approach to the world. Decades of war in the Middle East with little to show for it, rising inequality and the hollowing out of the nation's manufacturing sector, political paralysis over how to fix a dysfunctional immigration policy--these and other trends have been causing Americans to ask legitimate questions about whether U.S. grand strategy has been working to their benefit. Adding to the urgent and passionate nature of this conversation is China's rise and the threat it poses to the liberal international order that took shape during the era of the West's material and ideological dominance. Isolationism speaks directly to this unfolding debate over the future of the nation's engagement with the world. It does so primarily by looking back, by probing America's isolationist past. Although most Americans know little about it, the United States in fact has an impressive isolationist pedigree. In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington set the young nation on a clear course: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The isolationist impulse embraced by Washington and the other Founders guided the nation for much of its history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941"--

"Americans are weary of acting as the world's policeman, especially in the face of our unending economic troubles at home. President Obama stands for cutting defense budgets, leaving Afghanistan, abandoning Iraq, appeasing Russia, and offering premature declarations of victory over al Qaeda. Meanwhile, some Republicans now also argue for a far smaller and less expensive American footprint abroad. Pulitzer Prize-winning Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens rejects this view. As he sees it, retreating from our global responsibilities will ultimately exact a devastating price to our security and prosperity. In the 1930s, it was the weakness and vacillation of the democracies that led to war and genocide. Today the regimes in Tehran, Damascus, Beijing, and Moscow continue to test America's will. Americans have often been tempted to turn our backs on a world that fails to live up to our idealism and doesn't easily bend. But succumbing to that temptation always leads to tragedy. The mantle of global leadership is a responsibility we must shoulder for the sake of our freedom, our prosperity, and our safety"--

In 1995 Robert Harvey published The Return of the Strong: The Drift to Global Disorder. In the wake of the wake of the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001, he has revised the analysis of the dangers facing the world that he presented in this title. In Global Disorder: The New Architecture of Global Security he has added far-reaching proposals for the reform of global security. In the first three parts he outlines the rise of the USA to its dominant position as the world's first megapower, describing the sources of instability that create global disorder and threaten world peace, and the dangers in the globalization of capitalism free from political control. The final part outlines reforms and actions that Western democracies, particularly the USA, must undertake.

This iconoclastic and fundamental work, Eric Nordlinger's last, advocates a new variant of isolationism, a "national strategy" confining U.S. military actions largely to North America and to neighboring sea-and air- lanes but encouraging international activism and engagement in nonsecurity realms. In Nordlinger's view, disengaging from security commitments on distant shores would liberate the United States to use its resources and decision-making powers to act more effectively abroad in matters of economic policy and human rights. A national strategy would then become a powerful new method of encouraging international ideals of democracy, and isolationism would be freed of its previous associations with appeasement, weakness, economic protectionism, and self-serving nationalism. Nordlinger draws on the recent historical record to show that a national strategy would have lessened the perils of earlier decades, including those of the Cold War. While real dangers did exist during this period, engaged strategies, such as containment, too often exacerbated them. The United States could have effectively and far less expensively helped to deter Communist aggression in Europe and Asia by encouraging other nations to make larger investments in their own protection. Marshaling impressive empirical evidence in defense of a controversial position, this final work by a leading scholar of international affairs is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and lay readers alike.

Today, extensive interconnected global processes provide non-state actors with a degree of agency that a 'System of States' paradigm cannot account for alone. Using Russia-Latin America relations as a case study and applying a Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, this work explores alternative international mechanisms of order and organization.