This book seeks to investigate not only the causes of radicalization but also how radicalization has unfolded since 2009 based on an exhaustive review of the relevant literature and two stints of fieldwork in Bangladesh involving 71 in depth interviews of highly credentialed individuals. This book looks at both local and global factors that have served to provoke young Bangladeshis, many of whom are from relatively well-educated backgrounds, to become religiously belligerent and eventually to turn into terrorists. Ideology, it is argued, plays a pivotal role in the radicalization process, and justifies violence. Most importantly, ideology proffers solutions to the micro and macrocauses of commonly identifiable youth disaffection. This book mainly focuses on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda’s exploitation of religious beliefs and their construction of a mobilizing, apocalyptic narrative that strikes a chord with the young, middle-class Muslims. Both organizations target them for recruitment. The book ends by proffering what is called a ‘Pyramid Root Cause model,’ which attempts to tie all the causative variables of radicalization into a connected explanation of what has been happening in Bangladesh over the last decade. This book is of interest to scholars of political Islam, international politics, and security studies, including terrorism and the politics of South Asia.

In an unprecedented show of force, organization and skill, two proscribed Islamist militant organizations exploded more than 450 bombs within a span of less than an hour throughout Bangladesh on 17 August 2005 sending a strong message that they were a force to be reckoned with. This catastrophic event, followed by a number of suicide attacks, forced the then reluctant Bangladeshi government, a coalition of center-right parties with two Islamists among them, to acknowledge the existence of a network of militants and take action against this threat. Against this backdrop, this book is the first academic study on the growing Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. It examines the relevance, significance and trajectories of militant Islamist groups in Bangladesh, exploring the complex web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics that have both engendered and strengthened Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. The three factors - domestic, regional and international aspects - are each discussed separately and their connection and links are analyzed. It goes on to consider possible future trajectories of militant Islamism in Bangladesh. This book addresses an issue of great importance for contemporary Bangladeshi politics, and will be of interest to scholars of international politics and security studies, including terrorism and the politics of South Asia.

Blending reportage and analysis, Allchin investigates the Bangladeshi body politic to discern how Islamist radicals hope to reshape their country.

The past decade has seen a marked policy focus upon Bangladesh, home to nearly 150 million Muslims; it has attracted the attention of the world due to weak governance and the rising tide of Islamist violence. This book provides a broad-ranging analysis of the growth and impact of "political Islam" in Bangladesh, and reactions to it. Grounded in empirical data, experts on Bangladesh examine the changing character of Bangladeshi politics since 1971, with a particular focus on the convergence of governance, Islamism and militancy. They examine the impacts of Islamist politics on education, popular culture and civil society, and the regional and extraregional connections of the Bangladeshi Islamist groups. Bringing together journalists and academics - all of whom have different professional and methodological backgrounds and field experiences which impact upon these issues from different vantage points - the book assesses Bangladesh’s own prospects for internal stability as well as its wider impact upon South Asian security. It argues that the political environment of Bangladesh, the appeal of Islamist ideology to the general masses and the dynamic adaptability of Islamist organizations all demonstrate that Bangladesh will continue to focus the attention of policy makers and analysts alike. This is a timely, incisive and original explanation of the rise of political Islam and Islamic militancy in Bangladesh.

Is Bangladesh becoming a Taliban state? The question has become urgent in light of the growing strength of militant groups supposedly aligned with Al Quaida, the landslide victory of the center-right coalition in the general election of October 2001, and the deliberate and planned violence against religious minorities that followed. God Willing explores the explosive issue of Talibanization by analyzing the politics of Islamism in the world's third most populous Muslim country. Ali Riaz helps the reader to understand the emergence of Islamism as a legitimate democratic political in a largely secular state, as opposed to the media's sensational portrayal of Bangladesh as a country overrun by Islamist forces with a supranational agenda. The author compares Bangladesh with Indonesia and Pakistan, thus adding a valuable global context for evaluating the politics of Muslim countries.

Islamist militants based in Pakistan have played a major role in terrorism around the world and pose a significant threat to regional and international security. Although the Pakistan-militant connection has received widespread attention only in recent years, it is not a new phenomenon. Pakistan has, since its inception in the wake of World War II, used Islamist militants to wage jihad in order to compensate for severe political and material weakness. This use of militancy has become so important that it is now a central component of Pakistani grand strategy; supporting jihad is one of the principal means by which the Pakistani state seeks to produce security for itself. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strategy has not been wholly disastrous. It has achieved important domestic and international successes, enabling Pakistan to confront stronger adversaries and shape its strategic environment without the costs and risks of direct combat, and to help promote internal cohesion to compensate for its weak domestic political foundations. Recently, however, these successes of Pakistan's militant strategy have given way to serious problems. The militant organizations that Pakistan nurtured over the decades are increasingly exceeding its control; continued support for jihad diverts scarce resources from pressing domestic projects, impeding the country's internal development; and the militant campaign's repeated provocations have led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture. As Paul Kapur shows in Jihad as Grand Strategy, these developments significantly undermine Pakistani interests, threatening to leave it less politically cohesive and externally secure than it was before. Thus, despite its past benefits, the strategy has outlived its utility, and Pakistan will have to abandon it in order to avoid catastrophe. This will require not simply a change of policy, but a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the Pakistani state.