This report provides study results, research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare (IW) as introduced/described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (2006 QDR) report and the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare (IW) Roadmap. Specifically this study identifies current joint doctrinal treatment of IW and its aspects, to include content of ongoing revision efforts; identifies any joint doctrinal voids concerning IW and proposes courses of action for resolving identified voids; and identifies terminology implications/doctrinal issues related to IW. The study used a systematic approach by gathering pertinent information and then analyzing it in relation to IW. Thorough research and data collection was conducted on IW. Analysis centered on IW terminology and possible doctrinal voids and redundancies within the 10 IW activities (aspects) listed in the IW roadmap and, as a minimum, their associated joint publications (JPs). Conclusions were drawn regarding the doctrinal implications of IW. Finally, recommendations were made regarding the joint doctrinal treatment of IW and courses of action proposed for resolving identified joint doctrinal voids. Subject terms: irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, nontraditional warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, rebellion, revolt, civil war, insurrection, revolutionary warfare, subversive war, internal defense Contents: CHAPTER I * INTRODUCTION * - Section A: Purpose * - Section B: Methodology * - Section C: Study Outline * - Section D: Assumptions * - Section E: Administrative * CHAPTER II * RESEARCH AND DATA SUMMARIES * - Section A: Research on Irregular Warfare * - Section B: Research on Activities (Aspects) of Irregular Warfare * - Section C: Related Terms and Definitions * CHAPTER III * ANALYSIS RESULTS * - Section A: Overview * - Section B: The Irregular Warfare Construct * - Section C: Activities (Aspects) of Irregular Warfare * - Section D: Terms and Definitions * - Section E: Additional Analysis * CHAPTER IV * CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER V * RECOMMENDATIONS * ENCLOSURE * A. Request for Irregular Warfare Study * B. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency * C. Terrorism and Counterterrorism * D. Unconventional Warfare * E. Foreign Internal Defense * F. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations * G. Transnational criminal activities that support or sustain IW and the law enforcement activities to counter them * H. Civil-Military Operations * I. Psychological Operations * J. Information Operations * K. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations * L. Irregular Warfare Definitions * M. Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

This report provides study results, research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare (IW) as introduced/described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (2006 QDR) report and the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare (IW) Roadmap. Specifically this study identifies current joint doctrinal treatment of IW and its aspects, to include content of ongoing revision efforts; identifies any joint doctrinal voids concerning IW and proposes courses of action for resolving identified voids; and identifies terminology implications/doctrinal issues related to IW. The study used a systematic approach by gathering pertinent information and then analyzing it in relation to IW. Thorough research and data collection was conducted on IW. Analysis centered on IW terminology and possible doctrinal voids and redundancies within the 10 IW activities (aspects) listed in the IW roadmap and, as a minimum, their associated joint publications (JPs). Conclusions were drawn regarding the doctrinal implications of IW. Finally, recommendations were made regarding the joint doctrinal treatment of IW and courses of action proposed for resolving identified joint doctrinal voids.

This handbook comprises essays by leading scholars and practitioners on the topic of U.S. counterterrorism and irregular warfare campaigns and operations around the globe. Terrorist groups have evolved substantially since 9/11, with the Islamic State often described as a pseudo-state, a terrorist group, and insurgency all at the same time. While researchers', analysts', and policymakers’ understanding of terrorism has grown immensely over the past two decades, similar advancements in the understanding of counterterrorism lag. As such, this handbook explains why it is necessary to take a broader view of counterterrorism which can, and often does, include irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three thematic sections: Part I examines modern terrorism in the Islamic world and gives an overview of the major terrorist groups from the past three decades; Part II provides a wide variety of case studies of counterterrorism and irregular warfare operations, spanning from the 1980s to the irregular warfare campaign against the Islamic State in northern Syria in 2018; Part III examines the government instruments used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare, such as drones, Theater Special Operations Commands, and Theater Commands. The handbook fills a gap in the traditional counterterrorism literature by its inclusion of irregular warfare and by providing analyses from academic experts as well as practitioners. It will be of much interest to students of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, U.S. national security, military affairs, and International Relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-US-Counterterrorism-and-Irregular-Warfare-Operations/Sheehan-Marquardt-Collins/p/book/9780367758363, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

The United States has failed to achieve strategic objectives in nearly every military campaign since Vietnam. This memoir describes how the United States can begin to build the American way of irregular war needed for success in modern conflict.

This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations. Following the history, are three recommendations, each with internal supporting exposition.