Provides a critical review of the thorium fuel cycle: potential benefits and challenges in the thorium fuel cycle, mainly based on the latest developments at the front end of the fuel cycle, applying thorium fuel cycle options, and at the back end of the thorium fuel cycle.

The reactors around the world have produced more than 2000 tonnes of plutonium, contained in spent fuel or as separated forms through reprocessing. Disposition of fissile materials has become a primary concern of nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. There is a significant interest in IAEA Member States to develop proliferation resistant nuclear fuel cycles for incineration of plutonium such as inert matrix fuels (IMFs). This publication reviews the status of potential IMF candidates and describes several identified candidate materials for both fast and thermal reactors: MgO, ZrO2, SiC, Zr alloy, SiAl, ZrN; some of these have undergone test irradiations and post irradiation examination. Also discussed are modelling of IMF fuel performance and safety analysis. System studies have identified strategies for both implementation of IMF fuel as homogeneous or heterogeneous phases, as assemblies or core loadings and in existing reactors in the shorter term, as well as in new reactors in the longer term.

Spacecraft require electrical energy. This energy must be available in the outer reaches of the solar system where sunlight is very faint. It must be available through lunar nights that last for 14 days, through long periods of dark and cold at the higher latitudes on Mars, and in high-radiation fields such as those around Jupiter. Radioisotope power systems (RPSs) are the only available power source that can operate unconstrained in these environments for the long periods of time needed to accomplish many missions, and plutonium-238 (238Pu) is the only practical isotope for fueling them. Plutonium-238 does not occur in nature. The committee does not believe that there is any additional 238Pu (or any operational 238Pu production facilities) available anywhere in the world.The total amount of 238Pu available for NASA is fixed, and essentially all of it is already dedicated to support several pending missions-the Mars Science Laboratory, Discovery 12, the Outer Planets Flagship 1 (OPF 1), and (perhaps) a small number of additional missions with a very small demand for 238Pu. If the status quo persists, the United States will not be able to provide RPSs for any subsequent missions.

Comprehensive Nuclear Materials, Five Volume Set discusses the major classes of materials suitable for usage in nuclear fission, fusion reactors and high power accelerators, and for diverse functions in fuels, cladding, moderator and control materials, structural, functional, and waste materials. The work addresses the full panorama of contemporary international research in nuclear materials, from Actinides to Zirconium alloys, from the worlds' leading scientists and engineers. Critically reviews the major classes and functions of materials, supporting the selection, assessment, validation and engineering of materials in extreme nuclear environment Fully integrated with F-elements.net, a proprietary database containing useful cross-referenced property data on the lanthanides and actinides Details contemporary developments in numerical simulation, modelling, experimentation, and computational analysis, for effective implementation in labs and plants

Building upon the success of the first edition, the Nuclear Engineering Handbook, Second Edition, provides a comprehensive, up-to-date overview of nuclear power engineering. Consisting of chapters written by leading experts, this volume spans a wide range of topics in the areas of nuclear power reactor design and operation, nuclear fuel cycles, and radiation detection. Plant safety issues are addressed, and the economics of nuclear power generation in the 21st century are presented. The Second Edition also includes full coverage of Generation IV reactor designs, and new information on MRS technologies, small modular reactors, and fast reactors.

Global energy demands are driving a potential expansion in the use of nuclear energy worldwide. It is estimated that the global nuclear power capacity could double by 2030. This could result in dissemination of sensitive nuclear technologies that present obvious risks of proliferation. Certain international institutional mechanisms for controlling access to sensitive materials, facilities and technologies are needed for dealing with this problem. Over the past few years, 12 proposals have been put forward by states, nuclear industry and international organizations, aimed at checking the spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. This book presents an overview and analysis of these proposals, including an evaluation of the projected international mechanisms.