Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq’s reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014—that is, after the United States†“led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq’s reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors—specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom—as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.

According to conventional wisdom, Iraq has suffered because the Bush administration had no plan for reconstruction. That's not the case; the State Department's Future of Iraq group planned out the situation carefully and extensively, and Middle East expert David Phillips was part of this group. White House ideologues and imprudent Pentagon officials decided simply to ignore those plans. The administration only listened to what it wanted to hear. Losing Iraq doesn't't just criticize the policies of unilateralism, preemption, and possible deception that launched the war; it documents the process of returning sovereignty to an occupied Iraq. Unique, as well, are Phillips's personal accounts of dissension within the administration. The problems encountered in Iraq are troubling not only in themselves but also because they bode ill for other nation-building efforts in which the U.S. may become mired through this administration's doctrine of unilateral, preemptive war. Losing Iraq looks into the future of America's foreign policy with a clear-eyed critique of the problems that loom ahead.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the U.S. in Iraq since mid-¿03. By Spring '09, over $49 billion had been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. In June '09, A significant number of reconstruction activities, especially those involving construction of roads, sanitation, electric power, oil production, and other infrastructure, are completed or near completion. Most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded. However, many small-scale, targeted community-level infrastructure efforts are funded. The key emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Illustrations.

According to conventional wisdom, Iraq has suffered because the Bush administration had no plan for reconstruction. That's not the case; the State Department's Future of Iraq group planned out the situation carefully and extensively, and Middle East expert David Phillips was part of this group. White House ideologues and imprudent Pentagon officials decided simply to ignore those plans. The administration only listened to what it wanted to hear. Losing Iraq doesn't't just criticize the policies of unilateralism, preemption, and possible deception that launched the war; it documents the process of returning sovereignty to an occupied Iraq. Unique, as well, are Phillips's personal accounts of dissension within the administration. The problems encountered in Iraq are troubling not only in themselves but also because they bode ill for other nation-building efforts in which the U.S. may become mired through this administration's doctrine of unilateral, preemptive war. Losing Iraq looks into the future of America's foreign policy with a clear-eyed critique of the problems that loom ahead.

Iraq’s streets are unsafe, its people tormented, and its identity as a state challenged from within and without. For some, Iraq is synonymous with internal hatred, bloodshed, and sectarianism. The contributors to this book, however, know another Iraq: a country that was once full of hope and achievement and that boasted one of the most educated workforces in its region—a cosmopolitan secular society with a great tradition of artisans, poets, and intellectuals. The memory of that Iraq inspired the editors of this volume to explore Iraq’s current struggle. The contributors delve into the issues and concerns of building a viable Iraqi state and recognize the challenges in bringing domestic reconciliation and normalcy to Iraqis. From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq’s Troubled Journey examines Iraq’s reality after the 2003 US-led invasion. It begins by relating Iraq’s modern social and political history prior to the invasion and then outlines the significant challenges of democratization and the creation of an Iraqi constitution, which will be necessary for Iraq to become a strong and effective state. Co-published with the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).