Since the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian and ethnic divisions have widened, fueling a revival of a Sunni Muslim insurgent challenge to Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims resent Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues, particularly their intent to separately export large volumes of oil produced in the Kurdish region. The political rifts-which were contained by the U.S. military presence but have been escalating since late 2011-erupted into a large and sustained uprising in December 2013. The insurrection is led by the Sunni insurgent group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group and its allies still control several cities in Anbar Province, including the key city of Fallujah, and have pockets of control near Baghdad. The sectarian violence, which killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis in 2013, did not derail the national elections for a the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament) held on April 30, 2014, although voting in some Sunni-dominated areas was limited. Facing divided opponents, Maliki's slate won the most seats and he is expected to seek to retain his post for another four year term.

Since the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian and ethnic divisions have widened, fueling a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to Iraq's non-Muslim minority communities. Many of Iraq's Sunni Arabs have sided with radical Sunni Islamist insurgents as a means to reduce Shiite political domination. Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political disputes with Baghdad over territorial, political, and economic issues, particularly their intent to separately export large volumes of oil produced in the Kurdish region. The political rifts-which were contained by the U.S. military presence but escalated after late 2011-erupted in December 2013 into a sustained uprising led by the extremist group Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group and its allies took control of several cities in Anbar Province in early 2014 and captured Mosul and several other mostly Sunni cities in June 2014, accompanied by a partial collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The crisis has had some potentially serious consequences for Iraq's long-term future. The ISF collapse enabled the Kurds to seize control of the long-coveted city of Kirkuk, positioning the Kurds to break away from Iraq entirely were they to decide to do so. And, the crisis has provoked the revival of Shiite militia forces, politically aligned not only with dominant Shiite factions in Iraq but also with Iran. These forces have helped defend Baghdad and other areas to compensate for the weakness of the ISF, but the militias have also caused many Sunnis to see the Islamic State as a more favorable ally than the Iraqi government. The Islamic State's gains in Iraq prompted a U.S. military response in Iraq and formulation of a broader strategy, articulated by President Obama on September 10, to try to defeat the group in both Iraq and Syria. The President's speech came as a new government headed by Shiite Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi was inaugurated in Iraq. U.S. officials assert that Abbadi's government is more inclusive of Sunnis than was the government of ex-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, but many Sunnis apparently seek to assess his actions over an extended period of time before giving him their support.

Nearly three years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian divisions and the Sunniled uprising in neighboring Syria have fueled a revival of radical Islamist Sunni Muslim insurgent groups that are attempting to undermine Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims resent the Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts caused a significant uprising led by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq, now also known by the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), that began December 26, 2013 and gained control of several cities in Anbar Province. Earlier, unrest delayed some provincial elections during April-June 2013 and the latest uprising could affect the legitimacy of national elections for a new parliament and government set for April 30, 2014. Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that vote. The latest violence has exposed weaknesses in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the absence of direct U.S. military involvement in Iraq. To date, the 800,000-person ISF has countered the escalating violence by itself, but the violence killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis in 2013-more than double the figure for all of 2012. Informal security structures put in place during the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003-2011 have fractured or faltered in the late 2013-early 2014 ISIL challenge. And there are a growing number of reports that some Shiite militias have reactivated to retaliate for violence against Shiites. The American Administration and Congress continue to cultivate Iraq as an ally in part to preserve the legacy of the U.S intervention and to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran. Asserting that the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria is emboldening Iraqi Sunnis, Maliki has not joined U.S. and other Arab state calls for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to leave office and Iraq has not consistently sought to prevent Iranian overflights of arms deliveries to Syria. Still, the legacy of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Arab and Persian differences, and Iraq's efforts to reestablish its place in the Arab world limit Iranian influence over the Baghdad government.

VI. The Bureaucratic Web

This book proposes a significant reassessment of the history of Iraq, documenting democratic experiences from ancient Mesopotamia through to the US occupation. Such an analysis takes to task claims that the 'West' has a uniquely democratic history and a responsibility to spread democracy across the world. It also reveals that Iraq has a democratic history all of its own, from ancient Middle Eastern assemblies and classical Islamic theology and philosophy, through to the myriad political parties, newspapers and protest movements of more recent times. This book argues that the democratic history of Iraq could serve as a powerful political and discursive tool where the Iraqi people may come to feel a sense of ownership over democracy and take pride in endorsing it. This could go a long way towards mitigating the current conflicts across the nation and in stabilizing and legitimating its troubled democracy. Taking an interdisciplinary approach and referring to some of the most influential critical theorists to question ideological assumptions about democracy and its history, this book is useful to those interested in political and legal history, human rights and democracy.

Imposing sanctions on Iraq was one of the most heinous of crimes committed in the 20th century. Yet it has received little attention in the Anglo-American world. Despite the calamitous destruction resulting from the sanctions, no serious attempts by legal professionals, academics or philosophers have been undertaken to address the full scope of the immorality and illegality of such a criminal and unprecedented mass punishment. Genocide in Iraq offers a comprehensive coverage of Iraq’s politics, its building, its destruction through aggression and sanctions, and an analysis of the legality of these sanctions from the point of view of international laws and human rights laws. It presents a detailed policy analysis indicating how, under Ba’ath rule, Iraq had risen to become-be fore 12 years of total sanctions were globally enforced-the most progressive and developed Arab nation in the Middle East. It then contrasts that rising nation to the devastated remains left in the aftermath of sanctions, which nonetheless was yet to endure, in 2003, the full force of the American “shock and awe” invasion. The book explains why, in modern times, imperialist powers felt it was necessary to occupy Baghdad. It also puts forward the uniqueness of Iraq as at the heart of both Sunni and Shi’a theology, arguing it was this very centrality of Iraq, which far outweighs the significance of Arabia in socio-economic, religious and geostrategic dimensions, that at the same time makes Iraq a target. It details the building of Iraq by the Ba’ath regime, part of which was done with remarkable speed, putting to rest the argument that other countries in the area were developed at a similar pace. It also details the devastation of Iraq by 2003 after 12 years of sanctions-a devastation so dreadful that by the UN’s own accounting, some 500,000 child deaths were due to it; a devastation so pervasive and overwhelming that two of the UN’s own key administrators of the sanctions program, Dennis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck, resigned in protest.