Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is expressing optimism that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern new provincial elections to held in early 2009, will heal remaining rifts and continue to reduce violence. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence, as well as by cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and factional infighting continue to affect national decision-making and security. Some believe that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, strengthened politically by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, is increasingly authoritarian, in part to ensure that he holds power after the planned March 2010 national elections. Maliki is widely assessed as gaining control of the security services and building new security organs loyal to him personally. He also has formed cross-sectarian alliances with a wide range of Sunni and Kurdish factions to counter new coalitions by a wide range of erstwhile allies and former opponents. The continuing infighting among the major communities delayed the National Assembly's passage of the election law needed to hold the early 2010 national elections. The next Assembly will have 325 seats, compared to 275 seats in the current Assembly. The election date has been set for March 7, 2010, well beyond the January 31, 2010, date that was originally targeted. Based partly on the continued relatively low levels of violence in Iraq in February 2009 the Obama Administration announced a reduction of the U.S. troop presence to about 50,000 U.S. forces by August 2010. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Senior U.S. military leaders have said in January 2010 that the U.S. draw-down plans are "on track" and have not been altered by the violence or the election delay. Nor have the recent attacks reignited large-scale sectarian violence that could cause a U.S. reevaluation of its plans.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly exhibiting peaceful competition but continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. As 2009 began, there was renewed maneuvering by opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who view him as authoritarian and might try to replace him, particularly if his party had fared poorly in the January 31, 2009 provincial elections. However, campaigning for the provincial elections, held in all provinces except Kirkuk and the Kurdish-controlled provinces, was relatively peaceful and enthusiastic and there was a more diverse array of party slates than those that characterized the January 2005 provincial elections. The elections appear to have strengthened Maliki and others who believe that power should remain centralized in Baghdad. Internal dissension within Iraq aside, the Bush Administration was optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, coupled with the provincial elections, will sustain recent reductions in violence.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, is increasingly exhibiting peaceful competition but continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. As 2009 began, there was renewed maneuvering by opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who view him as authoritarian and might try to replace him, particularly if his party had fared poorly in the January 31, 2009 provincial elections. However, campaigning for the provincial elections, held in all provinces except Kirkuk and the Kurdish-controlled provinces, was relatively peaceful and enthusiastic and there was a more diverse array of party slates than those that characterized the January 2005 provincial elections. The elections appear to have strengthened Maliki and others who believe that power should remain centralized in Baghdad. Internal dissension within Iraq aside, the Bush Administration was optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, coupled with the provincial elections, will sustain recent reductions in violence.

Statement on whether or not the gov¿t. of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in an Act which requires a report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi gov¿t. actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi pop¿n., provide essential services to the pop¿n., & promote economic well-being. In summary, the Iraqi gov¿t. met 3, partially met 4, & did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, & it is unclear whether the Iraqi govt. will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. The gov¿t. has not enacted legislation on de-Ba¿athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, & militia disarmament. Tables.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration asserts that the passage of key laws in 2008 will help heal remaining rifts and continue to reduce violence. Others see the schisms widening as Iraqi leaders wrangle over unresolved issues that are complicating the holding of provincial elections. See CRS Report RL31339, "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security," by Kenneth Katzman.