This book examines the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the states of the Persian Gulf from 1979 to 1998. It covers perceptions Iranians and Arabs have of each other, Islamic revolutionary ideology, the Iran/Iraq war, the Gulf crisis, the election of President Khatami and finally the role of external powers, such as the United States. The author argues that over the twenty-year period, the policy has moved from being ideological to pragmatic; and that by tracing its history, we can better anticipate its future relationship.

Research completed January 1993.

Gregory Gause's masterful book is the first to offer a comprehensive account of the international politics in the Persian Gulf across nearly four decades. The story begins in 1971 when Great Britain ended its protectorate relations with the smaller states of the lower Gulf. It traces developments in the region from the oil 'revolution' of 1973–4 through the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war of 1990–1 to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, bringing the story of Gulf regional politics up to 2008. The book highlights transnational identity issues, regime security and the politics of the world oil market, and charts the changing mix of interests and ambitions driving American policy. The author brings his experience as a scholar and commentator on the Gulf to this riveting account of one of the most politically volatile regions on earth.

The first book to examine the interwar period origins of the present-day Arab-Iranian conflict.

The Islamic Republic of Iran faced a favorable strategic environment following the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Its leadership attempted to exploit this window of opportunity by assertively seeking to expand Iran's interests throughout the Middle East. It fell far short, however, of fulfilling its long-standing ambition of becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and a leading regional power in the broader Middle East. In Squandered Opportunity, Thomas Juneau develops a variant of neoclassical realism, a theory of foreign policy mistakes, to explore the causes and consequences of Iran's sub-optimal performance. He argues that while rising power drove Iranian assertiveness—as most variants of realism would predict—the peculiar nature of Iran's power and the intervention of specific domestic factors caused Iran's foreign policy to deviate, sometimes significantly, from what would be considered the potential optimal outcomes. Juneau explains that this sub-optimal foreign policy led to important and negative consequences for the country. Despite some gains, Iran failed to maximize its power, its security and its influence in three crucial areas: the Arab-Israeli conflict; Iraq; and the nuclear program. Juneau also predicts that, as the window of opportunity steadily closes for Iran, its power, security, and influence will likely continue to decline in coming years.

This book examines US policy toward Iran and Iraq during the 1990s and the impact of domestic politics on the US approach to the Persian Gulf. It offers a new theoretical perspective.

This book offers insight into the motives behind Moscow’s behaviour in the Persian Gulf (with a specific focus on the GCC member states and Iran), considering Russia’s growing role in the Middle East and its desire to protect national interests using a wide range of means. The book explores the drivers and motivations of the Russian foreign policy in the Gulf region, thus, helping the audience to generate informed prognosis about Moscow’s moves in this area over the next years. In contrast to most studies of Russia’s presence in the region, this book considers the Russian involvement in the Gulf from two standpoints – the Russian and foreign. The idea of the book is to take several key problems of Moscow’s presence in the Gulf, each of these to be covered by two authors—Russian and non-Russian scholars, in order to offer the readers alternative visions of Moscow’s policies towards Iran and the GCC countries