This book examines the dynamics of relations and the substance of the negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme. Iran’s nuclear programme and the alleged threat to international peace and security remains one of the most important issues in the United States, as well as in European foreign affairs. In the US, Iran has dominated the political discourse for over three decades and Europe has spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While relations between both states remain subject to mutual hostility, the EU remains a channel of communication and since 2003 has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework. By and large, the narrative on nuclear negotiations is dominated by constructivist and realist literature, portraying relations between the US and Iran in ideological terms as a prolonged struggle for regional influence. Embedded within conflict resolution and diplomatic theory, this work attempts to bridge this gap. Drawing upon primary documents and interviews, the text examines negotiation behaviour, and strategies and tools of statecraft, as well as analysing technical aspects of initiatives concerning the nuclear programme. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

The United States’ commitment to non-proliferation often propels its foreign policy rhetoric. In 2002, George W. Bush framed his goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons within the context of the global war on terror, accusing Iran of being part of the “Axis of Evil.” Iran’s nuclear program was declared an intolerable threat to global peace and stability. This approach however showed the conflict between the rhetoric of good vs. evil and the need for a pragmatic and measured approach to non-proliferation in the Middle East. The book explores this divergence between the alarmist rhetoric of the Bush Administration’s public diplomacy and its actual non-proliferation policy toward Iran. It shows how the two policy directions, the war on terror and negotiations over the nuclear issue, were often at odds. Further, the Administration’s desire to change the regime in Iran undermined efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Ultimately, the policies implemented failed both to shut down Iran’s nuclear program and bring significant democratic reform within the Islamic Republic. The book also examines this legacy and how Obama’s approach differs or follows that of his predecessor. Lastly, the implications for non-proliferation policies beyond Iran are discussed, as nuclear proliferation remains a key concern in a Middle East plagued by instability.

Iran is aggressively seeking nuclear technology that could be used for making weapons—and its quest has set off alarms throughout the world. This widespread concern stems in part from Iran's uncertain intentions and recent history. Will it remain a revolutionary power determined to subvert its Sunni Arab neighbors, destroy Israel, and spread theocratic government to other lands? Or would an Iran with nuclear weapons merely defend its territory from foreign aggression and live in peace with its neighbors? Are the country's leaders and society willing to negotiate limits on nuclear capability and normalize relations with the West, or will they resist accommodation? Iran's Nuclear Ambitions provides a rare, balanced look into the motivations, perceptions, and domestic politics swirling around Iran. Shahram Chubin, an Iranian-born security expert, details the recent history of Iran's nuclear program and diplomacy. He argues that the central problem is not nuclear technology, but rather Iran's behavior as a revolutionary state, with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbors and the West. Topics include: The view from Tehran Iran's nuclear energy rationale, domestic politics, and decisionmaking Sources of concern, including the nature of Iran's regime, its nuclear infrastructure, missile development, and terrorism Iran's negotiating strategy The international response Iran and regional security, including the U.S. as a threat and rival, Iran's regional ambitions, and Israel Policy options

Abraham D. Sofaer argues that US policy toward Iran cannot safely be restricted to a strategy that considers only the two high-risk, costly, and potentially infeasible options of a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities or containing a nuclear-armed Iran. Instead, the United States should respond forcefully to Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) aggression, enhancing its credibility and increasing the likelihood that Iran will negotiate in earnest. The United States must also be prepared to engage Iran in a disciplined manner, avoiding disabling preconditions and adopting the negotiating practices used successfully by the United States when dealing with the Soviet Union during the 1980s.

Have the diplomatic efforts of the Obama administration toward Iran failed? Was the Bush administration's emphasis on military intervention, refusal to negotiate, and pursuit of regime change a better approach? How can the United States best address the ongoing turmoil in Tehran? This book provides a definitive and comprehensive analysis of the Obama administration's early diplomatic outreach to Iran and discusses the best way to move toward more positive relations between the two discordant states. Trita Parsi, a Middle East foreign policy expert with extensive Capitol Hill and United Nations experience, interviewed 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—for this book. Parsi uncovers the previously unknown story of American and Iranian negotiations during Obama's early years as president, the calculations behind the two nations' dealings, and the real reasons for their current stalemate. Contrary to prevailing opinion, Parsi contends that diplomacy has not been fully tried. For various reasons, Obama's diplomacy ended up being a single roll of the dice. It had to work either immediately—or not at all. Persistence and perseverance are keys to any negotiation. Neither Iran nor the U.S. had them in 2009.

The definitive book on Obama's historic nuclear deal with Iran from the author of the Foreign Affairs Best Book on the Middle East in 2012 This timely book focuses on President Obama's deeply considered strategy toward Iran's nuclear program and reveals how the historic agreement of 2015 broke the persistent stalemate in negotiations that had blocked earlier efforts. The deal accomplished two major feats in one stroke: it averted the threat of war with Iran and prevented the possibility of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Trita Parsi, a Middle East foreign policy expert who advised the Obama White House throughout the talks and had access to decision-makers and diplomats on the U.S. and Iranian sides alike, examines every facet of a triumph that could become as important and consequential as Nixon's rapprochement with China. Drawing from more than seventy-five in-depth interviews with key decision-makers, including Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, this is the first authoritative account of President Obama's signature foreign policy achievement.

The definitive book on President Obama’s historic nuclear deal with Iran from the U.S. foreign policy expert and acclaimed author of Treacherous Alliance. In Losing an Enemy, Middle East policy expert Trita Parsi examines President Obama’s strategy toward Iran’s nuclear program and reveals how the historic agreement of 2015 broke the persistent stalemate in negotiations that had blocked earlier efforts. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, accomplished two major feats in one stroke: it averted the threat of war with Iran and prevented the possibility of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Parsi advised the Obama White House throughout the talks and had access to decision-makers and diplomats on the U.S. and Iranian sides alike. With his unique insight, he examines every facet of a triumph that could become as important and consequential as Nixon’s rapprochement with China. Drawing from more than seventy-five in-depth interviews with key decision-makers, including Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, this is the first authoritative account of President Obama’s signature foreign policy achievement. "A detailed and gripping account of the 22 months of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program that resulted in the 2015 deal."—John Waterbury, Foreign Affairs