Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Historical Context; (3) Overview of Iran¿s Economy; (4) Econ. Policy and Reform Efforts; (5) Iran and the Recent Global Econ. Turndown; (6) Econ. Stakeholders: Bonyads; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; Private Sector; (7) Econ. Sectors: Oil and Natural Gas; Ag.; Mfg.; Financial Sector; (8) Internat. Trade: Major Goods Traded; Key Trading Partners; U.S.-Iranian Trade; Internat. Sanctions and Internat. Trade; Trade Liberalization; (9) Internat. Financial Flows: Foreign Exchange Reserves; Foreign Invest. in Iran¿s Economy; Internat. Loans and Assistance; (10) Congress. Issues and Options: Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to Sanctions; Impact of Sanctions on Iran¿s Economy and Policy; Action in the 110th and 111th Cong.

After detailed discussions of the economy's basic sectors, major national economic trends, and the government's economic policies, the author offers an assessment of the economy's overall performance against the regime's initial agenda. The final chapters discuss the extent of the dilemma confronting the government.

The relationship between religion and the state has entered a new phase ever since the Iranian Revolution more than three decades ago. The recent mass uprisings against autocratic rulers in the Arab world have highlighted the potency of Islamist forces in post-revolutionary societies in the region, a force arguably unlocked first by Iran’s version of the ‘spring’ three decades ago. The economic ramifications of these uprisings are of special interest at a time when the possibility of the creation of Islamic states can have implications for their economic policy and performance again. A study of the Iranian experience in itself can offer rare insights whether for its own features and characteristics or for its possible lessons and implications for recent events in the region. This book is concerned with the economic aspects and consequences of the Iranian Revolution in general and its interaction with the international economy in particular. Many studies have to date dealt with Iran’s economic challenges, policies and performance in the post-revolutionary period but its interaction with the international economy – although of growing importance – has not received sufficient attention. The contributions in this volume by experts in the field address ways in which in the span of three decades, Iran’s economy has evolved from a strong aspiration to develop an ‘independent economy’ to grappling with debilitating international economic sanctions.

This study entails a theoretical reading of the Iranian modern history and follows an interdisciplinary agenda at the intersection of philosophy, psychoanalysis, economics, and politics and intends to offer a novel framework for the analysis of socio-economic development in Iran in the modern era. A brief review of Iranian modern history from the Constitutional Revolution to the Oil Nationalization Movement, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the recent Reformist and Green Movements demonstrates that Iranian people travelled full circle. This historical experience of socio-economic development revolving around the bitter question of “Why are we backward?” and its manifestation in perpetual socio-political instability and violence is the subject matter of this study. Michel Foucault’s conceived relation between the production of truth and production of wealth captures the essence of hypothesis offered in this study. Foucault (1980: 93–94) maintains that “In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth; indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place.” Based on a hybrid methodology combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this monograph proposes that the failure to produce wealth has had particular roots in the failure in the production of truth and trust. At the heart of the proposed theoretical model is the following formula: the Iranian subject’s confused preference structure culminates in the formation of unstable coalitions which in turn leads to institutional failure, creating a chaotic social order and a turbulent history as experienced by the Iranian nation in the modern era. As such, the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social assemblages and their affiliated hybrid forms of regimes of truth in the springs of freedom and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. Each time, after the experience of chaos, the order is restored based on the emergence of a final arbiter (Iranian leviathan) as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution. This highly volatile truth cycle produces the experience of socio-economic backwardness and violence. The explanatory power of the theoretical framework offered in the study exploring the relation between the production of truth, trust, and wealth is demonstrated via providing historical examples from strong events of Iranian modern history. The significant policy implications of the model are explored. This monograph will appeal to researchers, scholars, graduate students, policy makers and anyone interested in the Middle Eastern politics, Iran, development studies and political economy.

Post-war economic growth included recovery in oil output, but the country faced a severe economic downturn in the latter part of the decade due to a drop in international oil prices.3 Since the 1979 U. S. embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, Iran has been subject to various U. S. economic sanctions. [...] In June 2008, the five permanent members of the UNSC (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) and Germany offered to suspend further sanctions against Iran if Iran agreed to halt its uranium enrichment program and to begin negotiations on constraints of its nuclear activity.5 2 Abdelali Jbili, Vitali Kramarenko, and José Bailén, "Islamic Republic of Iran: Managing the Transition to [...] The IMF reported that Iran has the highest "brain drain" rate in the world.18 Economic Policy and Reform Efforts Over the past few decades, Iran has engaged in a series of five-year economic plans in order to shift its state-dominated economy into an economy that is market-oriented, private sector-led, and economically diversified. [...] Of primary concern to the United States and the international community is the purported use of oil export revenues to finance Iran's nuclear program and alleged support for terrorist groups. [...] While estimates vary about the size of the OSF, many observers express concern it no longer contains sufficient funds to cushion against the global economic turndown.28 Economic Stakeholders Iran's economy is heavily dominated by the state, which is the recipient of revenues from crude oil exports, and quasi-state actors, such as the bonyads and the commercial entities of the Islamic Revolutionary.