Tehran’s ability to fight by, with and through third parties in foreign jurisdictions has become a valuable and effective sovereign capability that gives Iran strategic advantage in the region. Tehran has possessed a form of this capability since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but its potency and significance have risen sharply in the past decade, to the point where it has brought Iran more regional influence and status than either its nuclear or ballistic-missile programmes. The IISS Strategic Dossier Iran’s Networks of Influence provides an understanding of how Iran builds, operates and uses this capability. Based on original field research, open-source information and interviews with a range of sources, the dossier conducts an audit of Iran’s activities in the principal regional theatres of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and its reach into Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It includes an examination of Tehran’s nurturing of groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, the Badr Organisation in Iraq, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Syria, and details related to recruitment, weapons supply, logistics and command-and-control systems. Iran’s Networks of Influence is intended through objective, fact-based analysis to inform both policymakers and practitioners, and to stimulate debate on the wider significance of Iran’s use of third-party partners and the strategic depth they afford Tehran. The dossier also examines the advantages that Iran possesses through its recent experience of conflict, and its ability to mobilise and deploy sympathetic Shia communities across theatres. In a time of rising tension in the region, the dossier looks at how Iran might further develop the use of its partnership capability and the risks and constraints it might face.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the strategic culture of resistance has dominated Iran’s strategic objective and foreign policy preference formation. Iran is a revisionist state that lacks overwhelming military and economic dominance in its near abroad, as such two pillars have emerged to support and export their strategic culture of resistance. These are Adaptive Resistance (pragmatism) and Designed Redundancy (deniability and insulation). These two themes of resistance provide content and structure to their strategic Influence campaigns, where “strategic Influence is the use of the elements of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, with and through information—to shape the information and operational environment in order to erode the will of the enemy…. This ‘new’ way of war is predicated on building narratives, activating identities, mobilizing proxies, and disorienting targets through the use of information in service of strategic goals.” Strategic influence is the way in which elements of the strategic culture of resistance are executed in Iran’s near abroad. To combat and defeat strategic influence campaigns, it is necessary to understand both the strategic cultural factors at play and the strategic influence campaigns that Iran deploys.

In recent years, significant attention has focused upon the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the threat they pose to the United States and the West. Far less well understood, however, has been the phenomenon of Iran’s regional advance in America’s own Hemisphere—an intrusion that has both foreign policy and national security implications for the United States and its allies. In this collection, noted specialists and regional experts examine the various facets of Iran’s contemporary presence in Central and South America, and detail what the Islamic Republic’s growing geopolitical footprint south of the U.S. border signifies, both for Iran and for the United States.

Iran has emerged from decades of isolation and struggle to become a leading, if not the pre-eminent, regional power. Iran projects its influence throughout the Middle East and parts of Central Asia. Moreover, Iranian diplomacy is active on the world stage, with long-term projects in Africa and South America. The landmark nuclear deal of July 2015 was a major triumph and saw the Islamic Republic successfully negotiate with several world powers to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Crucially, whilst the nuclear deal restricts Iran's nuclear programmed for at least a decade, it doesn't irreversibly dismantle any part of it. With internal Iranian politics stabilizing around a centrist administration led by President Rouhani, the country is set to continue on a path of regional strategic growth. But with clear signs that the Trump administration is determined to contain Iran's regional influence, what is the risk of a military confrontation? This book argues that Iran has developed sufficient diplomatic strength and credible military capability to deter a full-scale US military assault. But absent a dramatic lowering of tensions, there remains a risk of limited clashes, with far-reaching consequences for regional security.

Iran is the most significant current threat to the United States, the Middle East, and the West. As the evidence demonstrating this threat mounts, one thing remains clear to Ilan Berman: 'Washington is woefully unprepared to deal with this mounting peril.' Berman's approach is hard-hitting, provocative, alarmist, and unflinchingly critical. But he takes the indictment of Iran one step further providing what has been missing so far in the foreign policy discourse regarding Iran_both within the U.S. government and outside it_policy prescriptions designed to contain Iran's strategic ambitions.

The respective policies of the governments of Iran and Pakistan pose serious challenges to US interests in the Middle East, Asia and beyond. These two regional powers, with a combined population of around 300 million, have been historically intertwined in various cultural, religious and political ways. Iran was the first country to recognise the emerging independent state of Pakistan in 1947 and the Shah of Iran was the first head of state to visit the new nation. While this relationship shifted following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and tensions do exist between Sunni Pakistan and Shi'i Iran, there has nevertheless been a history of cooperation between the two countries in fields that are of great strategic interest to the US: Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Yet much of this history of cooperation, conflict and ongoing interactions remains unexplored. Alex Vatanka here presents the first comprehensive analysis of this long-standing and complex relationship.

The Islamic Republic of Iran faced a favorable strategic environment following the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Its leadership attempted to exploit this window of opportunity by assertively seeking to expand Iran's interests throughout the Middle East. It fell far short, however, of fulfilling its long-standing ambition of becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and a leading regional power in the broader Middle East. In Squandered Opportunity, Thomas Juneau develops a variant of neoclassical realism, a theory of foreign policy mistakes, to explore the causes and consequences of Iran's sub-optimal performance. He argues that while rising power drove Iranian assertiveness—as most variants of realism would predict—the peculiar nature of Iran's power and the intervention of specific domestic factors caused Iran's foreign policy to deviate, sometimes significantly, from what would be considered the potential optimal outcomes. Juneau explains that this sub-optimal foreign policy led to important and negative consequences for the country. Despite some gains, Iran failed to maximize its power, its security and its influence in three crucial areas: the Arab-Israeli conflict; Iraq; and the nuclear program. Juneau also predicts that, as the window of opportunity steadily closes for Iran, its power, security, and influence will likely continue to decline in coming years.