Spanning over a period of more than five decades since its inception, Iran’s nuclear programme is the most protracted civilian nuclear program in the world and one of the most politicized projects in Iran’s history. 'Iran and the Nuclear Question' offers a historiographical portrait of Iran’s early nuclear program under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Using declassified archival material, the book thematically chronicles the program’s genesis, evolutionary trajectory, and devolution from the 1950s through to the 1970s. It also catalogues the Revolutionary Iran’s early socialization into the atom and the Islamic Republic’s gradual change of heart about nuclear energy that culminated in the incremental resuscitation of the Shah’s nuclear enterprise in the 1980s. As the first archive-based account of one of the most long-lasting and capital-intensive nuclear enterprises during the Cold War, ‘Iran and the Nuclear Question’ is a valuable resource for students and scholars of Iranian, Middle East and Security Studies. Written in a clear and accessible format, it will also appeal to those with a more general interest in Iran and its nuclear journey.

Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.

This collection of essays provides an overview of how the current situation in the Middle East has come about, and how regional actors are likely to press ahead in the medium and long-term future.

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.

The author analyzes the Russo-Iranian relationship through the spring of 2006. This issue is vitally important in U.S. foreign policy, not just as it relates to Iran and the overall issue of nonproliferation, especially in the Middle East, but also as U.S. foreign policy pertains to relations with Moscow. Thus this monograph should also be read in light of the current crisis with Iran and bearing in mind the dimensions of Iranian proliferation and the issues surrounding it. At the same time, the numerous challenges to regional security in the Middle East, and the addition of great power rivalry to that list, further aggravate Middle East instability and make the search for peace that much more difficult. Consequently, the Russo-American dimension of the Iranian crisis adds to the complexity of the myriad issues and regional challenges to security, and the enduring difficulties in the Russo-American relationship.