The United States Constitution allocates the authority to initiate all forms of warfare and lesser armed hostilities exclusively to Congress, while reserving to the President the duty to repel invasions and execute the war effort as Commander in Chief. Nonetheless, many scholars have concluded that the President has some discretion in initiating hostilities. Other scholars have suggested that the constitutional allocation of the authority to make war is indeterminate, or, in the words of Edward Corwin, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." This paper returns to the relevant constitutional provisions and contemporaneous explanations of the allocation of the authority to initiate hostilities. It then analyzes the various constitutional and policy arguments made on behalf of presidential warmaking, as well as arguments suggesting substantial ambiguity in the allocation of the war power, and finds that such arguments are unconvincing in light of constitutional mandates.

An essential guide for Christians on how to achieve personal, ecclesial, and social transformation in the year of Jubilee.

In this highly original and thoroughly informed study, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Glenn Antizzo, and Leila S. Sarieddine identify and examine recurring modes or patterns of legislative behavior over the span of America's diplomatic experience. Although congressional involvement in foreign policy making has received much scholarly attention, this work is groundbreaking in that it focuses on those patterns of congressional conduct that have repeated themselves over time and, on the basis of experience, will probably continue to occur. Thus it creates a large, predictable framework of legislative activity concerning America's problems abroad to which students of U.S. foreign policy can relate Congress's actions in any era. The authors identify four models of legislative conduct -- congressional assertiveness and activism in foreign affairs, congressional acquiescence in diplomatic leadership by the president, a bipartisan approach, and a division-of-labor model in which both the president and Congress play significant but essentially different roles. In examining each of these modes, the authors explore the circumstances and factors that gave rise to each pattern and evaluate its positive and negative results for the overall foreign policy of the United States. Brimming with lively language and invaluable observations, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process offers a thought- provoking means to understanding a complex and important area in the study of American government.

Contents: The Report: executive summary; Central America; the arms sales to Iran; exposure and concealment; the enterprise; conclusions and recommendations. Also contains the Minority report: the foreign affairs powers of the Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair; Nicaragua; Iran; disclosure and investigations; putting Congress' house in order; and recommendations. Extensive appendices contain additional views of several Representatives and Senators.