Investment Management in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry
Title | Investment Management in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry PDF eBook |
Author | Carole Ferraro |
Publisher | |
Pages | 118 |
Release | 1983 |
Genre | Insurance companies |
ISBN |
Investment Management for Insurers
Title | Investment Management for Insurers PDF eBook |
Author | David F. Babbel |
Publisher | John Wiley & Sons |
Pages | 588 |
Release | 1999-02-15 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9781883249472 |
Investment Management for Insurers details all phases of the investment management process for insurers as well as fixed income instruments and derivatives and state-of-the-art analytical tools for valuing securities and measuring risk. Complete coverage includes: a general overview of issues, fixed income products, valuation, measuring and controlling interest rate risk, and equity portfolio management.
Insurance: From Underwriting to Derivatives
Title | Insurance: From Underwriting to Derivatives PDF eBook |
Author | Eric Briys |
Publisher | John Wiley & Sons |
Pages | 184 |
Release | 2001-06-29 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN |
An in-depth look at the increasingly significant convergence between the insurance industry and the capital markets. This important publication, by two premier financial experts, explores the unique convergence of finance and insurance. The book covers the basics of property-casualty insurance, securitizing insurance risks, looks at life insurance in the United States and ALM in insurance. It addresses the questions and concerns of investment banks, brokerage firms and the insurance/reinsurance sector itself, examines ongoing trends and issues, and how current market pressures on insurance companies do not just create challenges but actually point the way to future promising developments.
Investment Portfolio Management of a Selected Group of Property and Casualty Insurance Companies
Title | Investment Portfolio Management of a Selected Group of Property and Casualty Insurance Companies PDF eBook |
Author | James C. Ma |
Publisher | |
Pages | 12 |
Release | 1971 |
Genre | Insurance companies |
ISBN |
Property and Liability Insurance Investment Management
Title | Property and Liability Insurance Investment Management PDF eBook |
Author | Samuel B. Jones |
Publisher | |
Pages | 200 |
Release | 1971 |
Genre | Casualty insurance |
ISBN |
Insurance Company Investment Management Handbook
Title | Insurance Company Investment Management Handbook PDF eBook |
Author | Edmund A. Mennis |
Publisher | |
Pages | 680 |
Release | 1992 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN |
ESSAYS ON THE U.S. PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Title | ESSAYS ON THE U.S. PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY PDF eBook |
Author | Yingrui Lu |
Publisher | |
Pages | 137 |
Release | 2020 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
This dissertation includes two chapters. In Chapter 1, "Information Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital Revisited: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I revisit the relationship between information risk and the cost of equity capital in the U.S. property-casualty (P-C) insurance industry. Eckles, Halek and Zhang (2014) find that information risk has no effect on the cost of equity using a sample of U.S. P-C insurers. Following their approach, we decompose information risk into innate and discretionary components. I find that innate information risk affects the cost of equity capital through two opposing channels. On the one hand, innate information risk directly increases an insurer's cost of equity capital by increasing investors' assessment of the riskiness of the insurer's future cash flows. On the other hand, innate information risk indirectly decreases the insurer's cost of equity capital by changing its production so that the assessed riskiness of the firm's future cash flows are reduced. This (negative) indirect effect depends on factors that influence the insurer's underwriting decisions. My empirical results provide supporting evidence for a significant, positive direct effect of innate information risk, while the magnitude of the (negative) indirect effect increases with the insurer's proportion of long-tail business and decreases with its affiliated reinsurance usage. As to the impact of discretionary information risk, my results are mixed. I also find that, on average, the overall effect of information risk on the cost of equity capital for property-casualty insurers is significant and negative. In Chapter 2, "Coordination of Capital, Earnings, and Taxes in the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I investigate how property-casualty (P-C) insurers manage discretionary tools to achieve regulatory capital, earnings, and tax planning goals. I examine one accrual tool, loss reserve errors, together with two real transaction tools: realized capital gains (losses) from investment sales, and capital contributions. I find that when P-C insurers have lower pre-managed capital levels, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors, recognize more realized capital gains and receive more capital contributions. When P-C insurers have lower pre-managed earnings, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors. When P-C insurers have higher marginal tax rates, managers will report income-decreasing loss reserve errors and recognize more realized capital losses. Moreover, I analyze the effect of ownership structures on the degree of managerial discretion for various reporting goals. My analysis includes three different types of ownership structures: public, private stock and mutual firms. I find that, through the use of capital contributions, public firms are more aggressive in capital management, while mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management than private stock firms. In terms of using the other two tools, compared to private stock firms, public firms do not manage capital less aggressively; they do not manage earnings more aggressively; they do not manage taxes less aggressively. Compared to private stock firms, mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management; they are more aggressive in earnings management; they are less aggressive in tax management.