The highly acclaimed first edition of this major work convincingly established Gerald Holton’s analysis of the ways scientific ideas evolve. His concept of “themata,” induced from case studies with special attention to the work of Einstein, has become one of the chief tools for understanding scientific progress. It is now one of the main approaches in the study of the initiation and acceptance of individual scientific insights. Three principal consequences of this perspective extend beyond the study of the history of science itself. It provides philosophers of science with the kind of raw material on which some of the best work in their field is based. It helps intellectual historians to redefine the place of modern science in contemporary culture by identifying influences on the scientific imagination. And it prompts educators to reexamine the conventional concepts of education in science. In this new edition, Holton has masterfully reshaped the contents and widened the coverage. Significant new material has been added, including a penetrating account of the advent of quantum physics in the United States, and a broad consideration of the integrity of science, as exemplified in the work of Niels Bohr. In addition, a revised introduction and a new postscript provide an updated perspective on the role of themata. The result of this thoroughgoing revision is an indispensable volume for scholars and students of scientific thought and intellectual history.

"This textbook is intended for use in a course on scientific thought. It includes a mixture of classic readings from the great figures in science and in the philosophy of science, as well as practical essays on scientific methodology, ethics and pseudoscience. Students will be introduced to the scientific world view: its sphere and limitations. The book develops the methodology, epistemology, history and philosophy of science. It will give the student tools to reflect on the ethical implications of scientific discovery. In addition, the student will be trained in skepticism and critical thinking in order to distinguish pseudoscience from real science. The distinction between scientific and religious thought will be considered, as well as a discussion of the questions of interest to both. John Oakes received his bachelor of science in chemistry from the University of Connecticut in 1977 and his PhD in chemical physics from the University of Colorado, Boulder. Dr. Oakes has been a professor of chemistry and physics at Gonzaga University, Marian College (Wisconsin) and Grossmont College. He has taught classes on the history and philosophy of science for over twenty years and directed honors programs at both Marian College and Grossmont College. He has published six books and given invited lectures on science and religion at dozens of universities and in more than fifty countries.

How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is “really” like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of more than a hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Examples and asides engage the beginning student, a glossary of terms explains key concepts, and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. The second edition is thoroughly updated and expanded by the author with a new chapter on truth, simplicity, and models in science.

Not since Ernest Nagel’s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an authoritative and up-to-date treatment of the subject, and yet it is relatively brief and nontechnical. Hume’s skeptical arguments regarding the justification of induction are taken as a point of departure, and a variety of traditional and contemporary ways of dealing with this problem are considered. The author then sets forth his own criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability. Utilizing these criteria he analyzes contemporary theories of probability, as well as the older classical and subjective interpretations.