This book examines the international law of forcible intervention in civil wars, in particular the role of party-consent in affecting the legality of such intervention. In modern international law, it is a near consensus that no state can use force against another – the main exceptions being self-defence and actions mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. However, one more potential exception exists: forcible intervention undertaken upon the invitation or consent of a government, seeking assistance in confronting armed opposition groups within its territory. Although the latter exception is of increasing importance, the numerous questions it raises have received scant attention in the current body of literature. This volume fills this gap by analyzing the consent-exception in a wide context, and attempting to delineate its limits, including cases in which government consent power is not only negated, but might be transferred to opposition groups. The book also discusses the concept of consensual intervention in contemporary international law, in juxtaposition to traditional legal doctrines. It traces the development of law in this context by drawing from historical examples such as the Spanish Civil War, as well as recent cases such those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Libya, and Syria. This book will be of much interest to students of international law, civil wars, the Responsibility to Protect, war and conflict studies, and IR in general.

This book asks whether states have the right to intervene in foreign civil conflicts for humanitarian reasons. The UN Charter prohibits state aggression, but many argue that such a right exists as an exception to this rule. Offering a thorough analysis of this issue, the book puts NATO's action in Kosovo in its proper legal perspective.

The question of when or if a nation should intervene in another country’s affairs is one of the most important concerns in today’s volatile world. Taking John Stuart Mill’s famous 1859 essay “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” as his starting point, international relations scholar Michael W. Doyle addresses the thorny issue of when a state’s sovereignty should be respected and when it should be overridden or disregarded by other states in the name of humanitarian protection, national self-determination, or national security. In this time of complex social and political interplay and increasingly sophisticated and deadly weaponry, Doyle reinvigorates Mill’s principles for a new era while assessing the new United Nations doctrine of responsibility to protect. In the twenty-first century, intervention can take many forms: military and economic, unilateral and multilateral. Doyle’s thought-provoking argument examines essential moral and legal questions underlying significant American foreign policy dilemmas of recent years, including Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Tallinn Manual 2.0 expands on the highly influential first edition by extending its coverage of the international law governing cyber operations to peacetime legal regimes. The product of a three-year follow-on project by a new group of twenty renowned international law experts, it addresses such topics as sovereignty, state responsibility, human rights, and the law of air, space, and the sea. Tallinn Manual 2.0 identifies 154 'black letter' rules governing cyber operations and provides extensive commentary on each rule. Although Tallinn Manual 2.0 represents the views of the experts in their personal capacity, the project benefitted from the unofficial input of many states and over fifty peer reviewers.

The Law of International Conflict deals with three key principles of modern international law that are related to each other from a policy-oriented perspective. The prohibition in the UN Charter has not stopped the threat or use of force, since the system of collective security of the World Organization still fails to effectively enforce it. On the other hand, the UN has developed peacekeeping operations, non-military sanctions, the international administration of territories, tribunals trying individuals for serious breaches of international humanitarian law and the concept of responsibility to protect. The prohibition of intervention, i.e. coercion below armed force, also poses numerous problems. The alternative, the peaceful settlement of disputes, can be achieved by various methods, all of which have advantages and shortcomings.

During the 1990s, humanitarian intervention seemed to promise a world in which democracy, self-determination and human rights would be privileged over national interests or imperial ambitions. Orford provides critical readings of the narratives that accompanied such interventions and shaped legal justifications for the use of force by the international community. Through a close reading of legal texts and institutional practice, she argues that a far more circumscribed, exploitative and conservative interpretation of the ends of intervention was adopted during this period. The book draws on a wide range of sources, including critical legal theory, feminist and postcolonial theory, psychoanalytic theory and critical geography, to develop ways of reading directed at thinking through the cultural and economic effects of militarized humanitarianism. The book concludes by asking what, if anything, has been lost in the move from the era of humanitarian intervention to an international relations dominated by wars on terror.