The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. A new framework for approaching non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control could focus on a two-fold policy initiative. The first policy would be a new strategic "triad" built around conventional capability including rapidly deployable forces, regional ballistic missile defense, and long-range precision-strike capability. The second policy would employ an information strategy using the current diplomatic initiatives that appear to be the most productive, or unilateral and multilateral export controls, military assistance in the form of infrastructure, and confidence building measures. Continued success in arms control requires abandoning Cold War policies. Emerging policies will need to appreciate different world views. Good intelligence will be a key factor in the success of any policy orientation and its implementation. The focus needs to change from arms control involving the superpowers to arms control involving everyone.

This is the 49th volume in the Occasional Paper series of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Among the many dimensions of national security that face unprecedented changes and challenges after the end of the Cold War, arms control has been as directly affected as any other dimension. The formal, bilateral, and verification-based arms control that was so central to that former period fits neither the new environment nor the expanded focus beyond the strategic nuclear arena. In this paper, Guy Roberts presents yet another of his insightful explanations and analyses of the adaptations and new directions that are required to give arms control continued relevance today and tomorrow. This thorough analysis of the special case of biological warfare controls follows his January 2001 INSS Occasional Paper 36, "This Arms Control Dog Won't Hunt: The Proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament," in chronicling both the failure of continuing emphasis on formal Cold War-type arms control products and the enduring centrality of cooperative arms control processes in the current national security environment. In Roberts' line of argument, arms control is indeed dead, yet arms control can and must be reborn in the form of a wide range of integrally linked and multifaceted legal, diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to effectively fight the spread and use of dangerous weapons and systems.

"This paper is particularly timely, as it addresses emerging issues based in the changing forms and norms of post-Cold War arms control. These issues confront United States strategic planners and the national security policy community today, and they promise to have increasing impact into the future. As traditional arms control-with its focus most centrally on limiting and then reducing fielded U.S. and Soviet/Russian strategic systems-evolves into multilateral and multidimensional efforts to stem the now-central threat of proliferation, the whole landscape of arms control changes. The players, the multiple agendas, the role of international organizations in addition to the traditional focus on states all increase the complexity of the game and the difficulties in forging successful and verifiable international agreement at the very time when the problems of proliferation rise to the top of national security calculations. Guy Roberts explains this complexity and its effects on arms control-placing process over product and forcing those serious about controlling fissile materials to go in search of varied avenues and approaches-to educate us all on the emerging "rules of the game."--INSS website.

"As the United States continues to adjust to its role in the post-Cold War world, the transatlantic partnership remains fundamental to US security concerns. Commander Gunning[alpha]s paper is a wake-up call suggesting that Europe is concerned about US intransigence when it comes the security partnership with Europe. While the United States has often encouraged the Europeans to improve capabilities and take on a greater share of the defensive burden, their recent efforts to do so have often been viewed as paradoxical to US concerns. Policymakers on this side of the Atlantic worry that Europe in some ways is moving towards going it alone with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Still, US desires for increased burdensharing need to be reconciled with ESDP. Commander Gunning highlights these differences and spells out how, in his opinion, it is possible for the United States to remain engaged in Europe and to allow the European Union to develop its own defense identity. The differences of opinion between the two sides are more "speed bumps" than "road blocks" and some disagreement and frustration is to be expected. The conclusion here is that security interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be served in the long run by encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability and through American patience as that process unfolds."--Forward.

In this paper, the author differentiates and characterizes terrorists and insurgents, and he conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This work lays out the case that terrorism and insurgency differ, and that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency. As a result, the United States must amend and adapt its strategy to one of global counterinsurgency, beyond a global war on terrorism alone.

This is the 44th volume in the Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This report summarizes a three-phase research project undertaken by the USAF Institute for National Security Studies on behalf of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to forecast long-range global trends affecting arms control technologies. The report projects the international political, economic, and scientific environments to the year 2015. It posits economic and technological drivers as shaping the system, including its military and political dimensions. The result will be a two-tiered system, with great danger arising from significant proliferation in the second tier and the transition zone between tiers. The report next draws conclusions from this likely future for the scope, value, and practice of arms control. Arms control will be focused less on limitation and reduction of existing weapons, although the endgame between the United States and Russia will remain a significant effort. The focus will shift to the less well-defined realm of counterproliferation, and to marginal, failing, and failed states as well as nontraditional and non-state actors. New dimensions will be added, including control efforts toward small arms, advanced conventional weapons, military space, and information operations. The report then extrapolates from this future to assess the likely arms control technology requirements in cooperative, noncooperative, intrusive, and nonintrusive regimes. The projection here is continuing requirements for each of these specialized sets of technologies, with particular emphasis on multiple-use technologies for remote arms control compliance and verification monitoring as well as for intelligence detection and collection.

This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons.