This book explores the judiciary's role in achieving substantive equality utilising statutory discrimination law. The normative literature suggests that to eliminate discrimination, courts have to adopt a more substantive interpretation of discrimination laws, but the extent to which this has occurred is variable. The book tackles the problem by exploring the idea that there needs to be a 'creative' interpretation of discrimination law to achieve substantive results. The author asks: is a 'creative' interpretation of statutory discrimination law consistent with the institutional role of the judiciary? The author takes a comparative approach to the interpretation of non-discrimination rights by considering the interpretation of statutory discrimination law in the UK, Canada and Australia. The book explores the differences in doctrine that have developed by considering key controversies in discrimination law: Who does discrimination law protect? What is discrimination? When can discrimination be justified? The author argues that differences in the case law in each jurisdiction are explained by the way in which the appropriate role for the courts in rights review, norm elaboration and institutional competence is conceived in each studied jurisdiction. It provides valuable reading for academics, policy makers and those researching discrimination law and statutory human rights.

This book explores the judiciary's role in achieving substantive equality utilising statutory discrimination law. The normative literature suggests that to eliminate discrimination, courts have to adopt a more substantive interpretation of discrimination laws, but the extent to which this has occurred is variable. The book tackles the problem by exploring the idea that there needs to be a 'creative' interpretation of discrimination law to achieve substantive results. The author asks: is a 'creative' interpretation of statutory discrimination law consistent with the institutional role of the judiciary? The author takes a comparative approach to the interpretation of non-discrimination rights by considering the interpretation of statutory discrimination law in the UK, Canada and Australia. The book explores the differences in doctrine that have developed by considering key controversies in discrimination law: Who does discrimination law protect? What is discrimination? When can discrimination be justified? The author argues that differences in the case law in each jurisdiction are explained by the way in which the appropriate role for the courts in rights review, norm elaboration and institutional competence is conceived in each studied jurisdiction. It provides valuable reading for academics, policy makers and those researching discrimination law and statutory human rights.

Indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) concerns the application of the same rule to everyone, even though that rule significantly disadvantages one particular group in society. Ever since its recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1971, liberal democracies around the world have grappled with the puzzle that it can sometimes be unfair and wrong to treat everyone equally. The law's regulation of private acts that unintentionally (but disproportionately) harm vulnerable groups has remained extremely controversial, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. In original essays in this volume, leading scholars of discrimination law from North America and Europe explore the various facets of the law on indirect discrimination, interrogating its foundations, history, legitimacy, purpose, structure, and relationship with other legal concepts. The collection provides the first international work devoted to this vital area of the law that seeks both to prevent unfair treatment and to transform societies. Cited by Justice Miller in R v Sharma, 2020 ONCA 478, Court of Appeal for Ontario, 24 July 2020; by Justice Abella in Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28, Supreme Court of Canada, 16 October 2020; and by Justice Chandrachud in Nitisha v Union of India, WP(C) No-001109 - 2020, Supreme Court of India, 25 March 2021.

This book provides a comprehensive theory of age discrimination that can guide the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. The Act holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age and measures that are on their face age-neutral but have the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups are lawful only if the treatment can be shown either to be a 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim' or if the treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception. In this way, the proportionality test distinguishes justified and unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former legally permissible. This book outlines and defends a pluralist theory of age discrimination that assists in making the distinction between justified and unjustified age-differential treatment. The theory identifies the principles that explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and the principles that can justify this treatment. It is a pluralist theory because it recognises that age-differential treatment can wrong people for a number of different, overlapping reasons, and these different reasons should inform how we apply age discrimination law. The pluralist approach to age discrimination theory can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination cases by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests that are at stake in age discrimination claims. In constructing the theory, the book adopts the reflective equilibrium method. This requires that we examine our initial moral beliefs about age discrimination by seeking coherence with beliefs we have about similar moral and philosophical issues and revising the initial beliefs as a result of challenges to them. In applying this method, the book identifies the following five principles to form a pluralist theory of age discrimination: equality of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency.

In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you using a gun in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. What, exactly, is textualism? Why is strict construction a bad thing? What is the true doctrine of originalism? And which is more important: the spirit of the law, or the letter? The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated.

The value of work cannot be underestimated in today's world. Work is valuable because productive labour generates goods needed for survival, such as food and housing; goods needed for self-development, such as education and culture; and other material goods that people wish to have in order to live a fulfilling life. A job also generally inspires a sense of achievement, self-esteem and the esteem of others. People develop social relations at work, which can be very important for them. Work brings both material and non-material benefits. There is no doubt that work is a crucial good. Do we have a human right to this good? What is the content of the right? Does it impose a duty on governments to promote full employment? Does it entail an obligation to protect decent work? There is also a question about the right-holders. Do migrants have a right to work, for example? At the same time many people would rather not work. What kind of right is this, if many people do not want to have it? The chapters of this book address the uncertainty and controversy that surround the right to work both in theoretical scholarship and in policymaking. They discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the right to work, and its development in human rights law at national level (in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, France and the United States) and international level (in the context of the United Nations, the European Social Charter, the International Labour Organization, theEuropean Convention on Human Rights and other legal orders).