Global banks played a significant role in transmitting the 2007-09 financial crisis to emerging-market (EM) economies. The authors examine adverse liquidity shocks on main developed-country banking systems and their relationships to EM across Europe, Asia, and Latin Amer., isolating loan supply from loan demand effects. Loan supply in EM across Europe, Asia, and Latin Amer. was affected significantly through three separate channels: (1) a contraction in direct, cross-border lending by foreign banks; (2) a contraction in local lending by foreign banks¿ affiliates in EM; and (3) a contraction in loan supply by domestic banks, resulting from the funding shock to their balance sheets induced by the decline in interbank, cross-border lending. Charts and tables.

We analyze the transmission of bank-specific liquidity shocks triggered by a credit rating downgrade through the lending channel. Using bank-level data for US Bank Holding Companies, we find that a credit rating downgrade is associated with an immediate and persistent decline in access to non-core deposits and wholesale funding, especially during the global financial crisis. This translates into a reduction in lending to households and non-financial corporates at home and abroad. The effect on domestic lending, however, is mitigated when banks (i) hold a larger buffer of liquid assets, (ii) diversify away from rating-sensitive sources of funding, and (iii) activate internal liquidity support measures. Foreign lending is significantly reduced during a crisis at home only for subsidiaries with weak funding self-sufficiency.

"This paper studies how global banks transmit liquidity shocks via their internal capital markets. The unexpected access of German banks' affiliates located in the United States (US) to the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility (TAF) serves as our liquidity shock. Using microdata on all affiliates abroad, the authors test whether affiliates located outside the US adjusted their balance sheets during periods, when the US-located affiliate of the same parent received TAF loans. Their analysis has three main findings. First, during periods of active TAF borrowing, foreign affiliates of parent banks with high US dollar funding needs reduced their foreign assets by less. They identify those parents based on their pre-crisis exposure to the US asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. Second, foreign affiliates in financial centers also shrank their assets less. Third, there is no evidence that the ABCP exposure per se is driving the reduction of activity outside the US. In sum, their results show that the TAF program spilled over into foreign markets, while highlighting the importance of actively managed internal capital markets and the increased centralization of global banks' liquidity management at the domestic parent during and after the financial crisis."--Abstract.

Using a regulatory dataset of foreign bank branches in Hong Kong, this study finds evidence of the international transmission of funding shocks from home countries of global banks through their internal capital markets during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Global banks are found to buffer parent-bank liquidity shocks by repatriating cross-border internal funding, leading to reductions in loan supply by branches in Hong Kong. Branches with a higher loan-to-asset ratio are estimated to cut loan supply sharper than their counterparts. More liquid assets held by parent banks and central bank liquidity are found to reduce the extent of shock transmission significantly.

We examine the international transmission of liquidity and capital shocks from multinational bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Our findings are consistent with the studies that document the negative impact of parent bank fragility on subsidiaries' lending. We further find that foreign bank lending is determined by different factors in developing economies and in developed countries. Moreover, the reduction in lending is stronger for those subsidiaries that are dependent on the interbank market. Finally, we find that market discipline plays a less important role in developing economies during the recent crisis. Instead, liquidity needs determine the change in deposits.