Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Economics - International Economic Relations, grade: 2,0, University of Göttingen (Professur für Empirische Außenwirtschaft), course: International Financial Markets, language: English, abstract: In this paper, potential of international risk sharing for emerging markets will be investigated, particularly in terms of financial integration and liberalization. The incentives of financial integration will be surveyed in terms of international risk sharing, indicate benefits for emerging market economies. In addition, it will be investigated if huge foreign capital inflows show positive effects of risk sharing for them. Several government leaders all over the world recognize the potential of financial globalization for their country. A strong incentive for deeper financial linking can be observed. Three of the development countries in Africa already grew up to the so called emerging markets: Egypt, Morocco and South Africa. To keep up with the fast growing population and facilitating the economic growth, they want to stimulate employments for agriculture and infrastructure by investment partnerships with the G20, whereas Donald Trump, the President of the USA, would like to cut funding World Bank programs like credit guarantees or small business access to finance for these countries. Indeed, these development countries, also including emerging markets, need to implement more structural changes like liberalizing financial markets and financial transparency for these intentions. Is international risk sharing able to smooth uncertainties in the emerging markets? Will they catch up the distance to industrial countries? In light of ongoing financial integration and economic development, the influence of international risk sharing in terms of financial globalization for emerging markets will be investigated. Just little evidence of risk sharing can be seen throughout the last decades, but still some persuasive inquiries are to be considered. Improvements in international risk sharing potentially lead to stabilizing effects, scarcer sudden stops and smaller risk premiums. Structural policy changes and better financial integration could surmount the threshold effect.

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. This paper provides a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examines how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. The most interesting result is that even emerging market economies, which have experienced large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which has dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. This paper provides a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examines how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. The most interesting result is that even emerging market economies, which have experienced large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which has dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.

Financial globalization has increased dramatically over the past three decades, particularly for advanced economies, while emerging market and developing countries experienced more moderate increases. Divergences across countries stem from different capital control regimes, and factors such as institutional quality and domestic financial development. Although, in principle, financial globalization should enhance international risk sharing, reduce macroeconomic volatility, and foster economic growth, in practice its effects are less clear-cut. This paper envisages a gradual and orderly sequencing of external financial liberalization and complementary reforms in macroeconomic policy framework as essential components of a successful liberalization strategy.

This study provides a candid, systematic, and critical review of recent evidence on this complex subject. Based on a review of the literature and some new empirical evidence, it finds that (1) in spite of an apparently strong theoretical presumption, it is difficult to detect a strong and robust causal relationship between financial integration and economic growth; (2) contrary to theoretical predictions, financial integration appears to be associated with increases in consumption volatility (both in absolute terms and relative to income volatility) in many developing countries; and (3) there appear to be threshold effects in both of these relationships, which may be related to absorptive capacity. Some recent evidence suggests that sound macroeconomic frameworks and, in particular, good governance are both quantitatively and qualitatively important in affecting developing countries’ experiences with financial globalization.

Over the past two decades, the percentage of the world’s population living on less than a dollar a day has been cut in half. How much of that improvement is because of—or in spite of—globalization? While anti-globalization activists mount loud critiques and the media report breathlessly on globalization’s perils and promises, economists have largely remained silent, in part because of an entrenched institutional divide between those who study poverty and those who study trade and finance. Globalization and Poverty bridges that gap, bringing together experts on both international trade and poverty to provide a detailed view of the effects of globalization on the poor in developing nations, answering such questions as: Do lower import tariffs improve the lives of the poor? Has increased financial integration led to more or less poverty? How have the poor fared during various currency crises? Does food aid hurt or help the poor? Poverty, the contributors show here, has been used as a popular and convenient catchphrase by parties on both sides of the globalization debate to further their respective arguments. Globalization and Poverty provides the more nuanced understanding necessary to move that debate beyond the slogans.

The paper provides a general-equilibrium model where incomplete international financial markets lead to insufficient industrial specialization and low international trade. As international portfolio diversification is limited and productivity is uncertain, investors wish to maintain a diversified industrial structure rather than specializing according to their comparative advantage. Financial globalization then induces more specialization and more trade. The present framework yields explicit closed-form solutions for the volume and the structure of trade. Empirical results support the implications of the theory. Trade in financially open countries is (i) higher, (ii) more dependent on productivity differences, and (iii) less sensitive to industry risks.