The analysis of national systems shows that states do not follow a single legislative model to govern criminal responsibility for international crimes at the national level, and often face doubts as to how far they are only expected to copy international constructions, and how far they should modify treaty or customary international law solutions to adapt them to their specific needs or legal culture. In the presented texts, the reader will find a range of commentaries on the definition of crimes, the rules of jurisdiction, the rules of responsibility, as well as difficulties in the framing of specific crimes within a judgement. The texts refer to the practice of national courts as well as international and internationalized courts. The authors of this publication hope that showing various national perspectives, political and – at times – cultural impacts on certain legal solutions will both facilitate understanding of the doubts as to the current form of international law norms and the system of international justice now in operation, and enable learning lessons for the future directions of amendments to national legislations, so that errors or difficulties once encountered in some countries could be turned into more robust legal constructions in others.

This book focuses on the concept of state responsibility for international crimes, which gained support following the First World War, but was pushed into the background by the development of the principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law after the Second World War. Jorgensen considers the history and merits of a concept that, it is argued, is currently on the threshold between lex ferenda and lex lata.

States are obliged under treaties such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention to enact legislation that gives effect in national criminal law to prohibitons in the treaties. The law and practice of international criminal jurisdictions provide that it is significant whether national prosecutions for conduct amounting to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes can use the characterization of international crimes and not just ordinary crimes (such as murder). Several states have already imported these international crimes into national criminal law - for example, Canada and Germany. This publication is based on presentations made at a seminar organized by the Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law (FICHL) on 27 October 2006 focused on particular challenges in the process to import such crimes into national law.

American reluctance to join the International Criminal Court illuminates important trends in international security and a central dilemma facing U.S. Foreign policy in the 21st century. The ICC will prosecute individuals who commit egregious international human rights violations such as genocide. The Court is a logical culmination of the global trends toward expanding human rights and creating international institutions. The U.S., which fostered these trends because they served American national interests, initially championed the creation of an ICC. The Court fundamentally represents the triumph of American values in the international arena. Yet the United States now opposes the ICC for fear of constraints upon America's ability to use force to protect its national interests. The principal national security and constitutional objections to the Court, which the volume explores in detail, inflate the potential risks inherent in joining the ICC. More fundamentally, they reflect a belief in American exceptionalism that is unsustainable in today's world. Court opponents also underestimate the growing salience of international norms and institutions in addressing emerging threats to U.S. national interests. The misguided assessments that buttress opposition to the ICC threaten to undermine American leadership and security in the 21st century more gravely than could any international institution.

This book offers a unique comparison between state and individual responsibility for international crimes and examines the theories that can explain the relationship between these two regimes. The study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relevant international practice from the standpoint of both international criminal law, and in particular the case law of international criminal tribunals, and state responsibility. The author shows the various connections and issues arising from the parallel establishment of state and individual responsibility for the commission of the same international crimes. These connections indicate a growing need to better co-ordinate these regimes of international responsibility. The author maintains that a general conception, according to which state and individual responsibility are two separate sets of secondary rules attached to the breach of the same primary norms, can help to solve the various issues relating to this dual responsibility. This conception of the complementarity between state and individual responsibility justifies co-ordination and consistent application of these two different regimes, each of which aims to foster compliance with the most important obligations owed to the international community as a whole.

This 2005 book discusses the legitimacy of the international criminal law regime. It explains the development of the system of international criminal law enforcement in historical context, from antiquity through the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, to modern-day prosecutions of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The modern regime of prosecution of international crimes is evaluated with regard to international relations theory. The book then subjects that regime to critique on the basis of legitimacy and the rule of law, in particular selective enforcement, not only in relation to who is prosecuted, but also the definitions of crimes and principles of liability used when people are prosecuted. It concludes that although selective enforcement is not as powerful as a critique of international criminal law as it was previously, the creation of the International Criminal Court may also have narrowed the substantive rules of international criminal law.