We develop and test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate governance in 22 countries, we find that cross-border M&As are associated with subsequent improvements in the governance, valuation, and productivity of the target firms’ local rivals. This positive spillover effect is stronger when the acquirer is from a country with stronger shareholder protection and if the target’s industry is more competitive. We conclude that the international market for corporate control promotes the adoption of better corporate governance practices around the world.

We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country non-target firms. Using firm-level data from 22 countries, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent improvements in the governance of target firms' rivals. The spillover is more pronounced when the acquirer's country has stronger investor protection than the target's country, and when the target operates in a competitive industry. Cross-border M&As also lead to increases in valuation and reductions in overinvestment of non-target firms. Our results suggest that the international market for corporate control promotes functional convergence in corporate governance.

We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data from 64 countries during the period 2005-2014, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent improvements in the governance of non-target firms when the acquirer country has stronger investor protection than the target country. The effect is more pronounced when the target industry is more competitive. Cross-border M&As are also associated with increases in investment and valuation of non-target firms. Alternative explanations such as access to global financial markets and cultural similarities do not appear to explain our findings.

We develop and test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate governance in 22 countries, we find that cross-border M&As are associated with subsequent improvements in the governance, valuation, and productivity of the target firms’ local rivals. This positive spillover effect is stronger when the acquirer is from a country with stronger shareholder protection and if the target’s industry is more competitive. We conclude that the international market for corporate control promotes the adoption of better corporate governance practices around the world.

For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.

Corporate Fraud Exposed uncovers the motivations and drivers of fraud including agency theory, executive compensation, and organizational culture. It delves into the consequences of fraud for various firm stakeholders, and its spillover effects on other corporations, the political environment, and financial market participants.

Explore the interplay between corporate governance and strategic decision-making in this startling new resource In Understanding and Managing Strategic Governance, strategy and management experts Dr. Wei Shi and Robert E. Hoskisson deliver an insightful exploration of the influence that governance actors, like the board of directors, activist investors, institutional investors, and securities analysts, have on important strategic decisions. Based on surveying the latest research and analyzing unique datasets compiled by the authors, the book explains the impact that governance actors have on a firm’s strategic choices and the quality of such choices as well as the unintended consequences of that impact. The authors also describe how executives can manage the conflicting interests of multiple governance actors and leverage the influence of these actors to make effective strategic decisions. In this book, you’ll discover: How to avoid the strategic pitfalls that arise from governance actor influence and harm firms’ long-term competitiveness The effect that governance actors can have on corporate strategy, competitive strategy, corporate innovation strategy, global strategy, stakeholder strategy, and more The latest trends in corporate governance and their implications for managers, regulators, and policy makers in this area Perfect for C-level executives, board of directors, and institutional investors as well as students of corporate governance and strategy, Understanding and Managing Strategic Governance is a revealing and original examination of the interplay between corporate governance and firm strategy and how to manage that interplay to create sustainable competitive advantages.