Intergovernmental Transfers in Federations presents a synthesis of international experience of large federations in the most recent times in addressing the most fundamental issue of horizontal and vertical imbalances in their countries through the prism of intergovernmental transfers. Contributors delve into the various aspects of policy making as well as policy choices in selecting an efficiency path for a meaningful fiscal devolution aimed at integrating performance and incentives to reach an expenditure mix that facilitates better service delivery.

Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Politics - Other International Politics Topics, , language: English, abstract: The paper deals with intergovernmental fiscal transfer in comparative analysis of Germany, Nigeria and Ethiopia federation. The first chapter concerns about the concept of intergovernmental fiscal transfer and the objective of having intergovernmental fiscal transfer. In chapter two the types of fiscal imbalances are discussed from the view of three federal countries arrangements. Types of intergovernmental fiscal transfer and institutions are examined in chapter three. In addition to that procedure for establishing and modifying intergovernmental transfers as well as the design of intergovernmental transfers are included in this chapter. Chapter four is particularly concerned in reviewing the legal frame work and experience of three federal countries (Germany, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The chapter discusses in brief the intergovernmental fiscal transfers legal frame work and practice as well as challenges of each of the three federal countries and dispute resolution mechanism. Lastly the paper ends with a conclusion and the comparative lessons that Ethiopia could draw from the foreign experiences. Federalism is alleged to serve various purposes that could not be effectively handled by other forms of state formation structures. It is a gain saying that the federal arrangement is chosen for driving a benefit from a strong union without compromising regional autonomy. In federal arrangements that are primarily concerned in devolving powers mainly from the central to the sub national governments. This may also involve assigning expenditure and revenue responsibilities between the federal and regional governments and the need to rectify the fiscal gaps arising there from. This is the subject matter of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism is in general dividing the fiscal aspects of the functions of government (expenditure and revenue assignments) and the subsequent need for intergovernmental fiscal transfer between the tiers of government. It is principally concerned in allocating expenditure responsibilities, the revenue raising power, and rectifying the fiscal imbalances between the central and sub national governments through intergovernmental fiscal transfers.

These essays on the economics of fiscal federalism contains original research by experts in North America and Europe on a timely topic. Reform of fiscal relations between central and subnational governments is an urgent priority in many countries since increased economic integration within and among countries means that goods, services, capital, and human resources can flow across political boundaries more easily than before. The structure of intergovernmental transfers, tax competition, and the fiscal implications of labor migration are analyzed for audiences in economics, political science, and public policy.

The design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has a strong bearing on efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance. This book provides a comprehensive one-stop window/source of materials to guide practitioners and scholars on design and worldwide practices in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and their implications for efficiency, and equity in public services provision as well as accountable governance.

Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that national policymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these political compulsions, several federations around the world have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers to subnational jurisdictions. The author tests whether constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing political influence by contrasting the impact of political variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose regional distribution is determined by political agents, usually provide greater resources to state governments that are politically affiliated with the national ruling party and are important in maximizing the party's representation in the national legislature. But the political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an independent agency with constitutional authority, is strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can affect resources available to subnational governments.

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of subnational finance in most countries. They are used to ensure that revenues roughly match the expenditure needs of various orders (levels) of subnational governments. They are also used to advance national, regional, and local area objectives, such as fairness and equity, and creating a common economic union. The structure of these transfers creates incentives for national, regional, and local governments that have a bearing on fiscal management, macroeconomic stability, distributional equity, allocative efficiency, and public services delivery. This paper reviews the conceptual, empirical, and practice literature to distill lessons of policy interest in designing the fiscal transfers to create the right incentives for prudent fiscal management and competitive and innovative service delivery. It provides practical guidance on the design of performance-oriented transfers that emphasize bottom-up, client-focused, and results-based government accountability. It cites examples of simple but innovative grant designs that can satisfy grantors' objectives while preserving local autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive, responsible, equitable, and accountable public governance. The paper further provides guidance on the design and practice of equalization transfers for regional fiscal equity as well as the institutional arrangements for implementation of such transfer mechanisms. It concludes with negative (practices to avoid) and positive (practices to emulate) lessons from international practices.