Intentional behaviorism is a philosophy of psychology that seeks to ascertain the place and nature of cognitive explanation of behavior by empirically determining the scope of an extensional account of behavior based on the limitations of a behavioral approach to explanation. This book draws on an empirical program of research in economic psychology to establish a route to a reliable and justifiable intentional explanation of behavior. Since the cognitive revolution in psychology, intentional explanations of behavior have become the norm, and as the methodology that provides the normal science component of psychology, cognitivism is sometimes accepted relatively uncritically. However, there is a lack of understanding of the role of psychological research in determining the place and shape of intentionality. This book explicates the philosophy of psychology that the author has devised and applied in his work on economic psychology and behavioral economics. Given the provenance of intentional behaviorism, economic and consumer psychology forms the primary application basis for the book. This book provides a theoretical background to understanding how and why consumers make the choices they do. The book integrates behavioral economics, consumer psychology, and decision-making research to explore intentional behaviorism, which is proposed as a philosophical framework for consumer psychology, viewing economic behavior in the contexts of modern human consumers in affluent marketing-oriented societies. Integrates research in behavioral economics, decision-making, cognitive psychology, and consumer psychology. Offers readers an interdisciplinary look at intentionality and intentional explanations. Proposes a theory of intentional behaviorism to explain economic behavior, consumer choice, and other decision-making. Examines the methodologies of philosophers of mind such as Dennett and Searle.

What is the difference between a wink and a blink? The answer is important not only to philosophers of mind, for significant moral and legal consequences rest on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary behavior. However, "action theory"—the branch of philosophy that has traditionally articulated the boundaries between action and non-action, and between voluntary and involuntary behavior—has been unable to account for the difference. Alicia Juarrero argues that a mistaken, 350-year-old model of cause and explanation—one that takes all causes to be of the push-pull, efficient cause sort, and all explanation to be prooflike—underlies contemporary theories of action. Juarrero then proposes a new framework for conceptualizing causes based on complex adaptive systems. Thinking of causes as dynamical constraints makes bottom-up and top-down causal relations, including those involving intentional causes, suddenly tractable. A different logic for explaining actions—as historical narrative, not inference—follows if one adopts this novel approach to long-standing questions of action and responsibility.

Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative explanation of how we come to have intentions and elaborates on his earlier work concerning akratic failures of will.

Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. In the first part, Mele illuminates the connection between desire and action and defends detailed characterizations of irresistible desires and reasons for action. Mele argues for the viability of a causal approach to the explanation of intentional action in terms of psychological states and events, paying special attention to recent worries about the causal relevance of the mental. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele's account, based largely on a careful study of the functions of intentions, presents intentions as states irreducible to collections of beliefs and desires which hinge on their executive and representational features. Springs of Action will be of interest not only to philosophers of action, but also to those interested in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and ethics.

Handbook of Behaviorism provides a comprehensive single source that summarizes what behaviorism is, how the various "flavors" of behaviorism have differed between major theorists both in psychology and philosophy, and what aspects of those theories have been borne out in research findings and continue to be of use in understanding human behavior.

This book presents and discusses seven contemporary theoretical approaches to behavior analysis that build upon the foundations laid by B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism and renew its legacy. These contemporary approaches show that behaviorism is not a monolithic or static intellectual tradition, but a dynamic movement, which changes and adapts in face of new questions, issues, and perspectives. The death of behaviorism has been proclaimed since its early days – a “premature” assessment, to say the least – but this volume shows that behaviorism is alive and kicking, even thirty years after its main proponent passed away. This volume contains seven sections, each one dedicated to a particular variation of contemporary behaviorism: Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism, William Baum’s molar behaviorism and multiscale behavior analysis, John Staddon’s theoretical behaviorism, John Donahoe’s biological behaviorism, Gordon Foxall’s intentional behaviorism, Steven Hayes’ contextual behaviorism or contextual behavioral science, and Emilio Ribes-Iñesta’s field-theory behaviorism. Each section contains three chapters: the first one written by the original proponent of each of these forms of behaviorism, the second one written by a commentator, and the third one written by the proponent, replying to the commentator. Contemporary Behaviorisms in Debate will be a valuable tool to behavior analysts and psychologists in general by providing an introduction to contemporary forms of behaviorism and promoting debates about the main philosophical issues faced by the field of behavior analysis today— issues that can directly influence future epistemological variations in the selection process of “behaviorisms.” By doing so the book is directed not only to the present, but, more importantly, toward the future of the field.

Context and Cognition in Consumer Psychology is concerned with the psychological explanation of consumer choice. It pays particular attention to the roles of perception and emotion in accounting for consumers’ actions and their interaction with the desires and beliefs in terms of which consumer choice is frequently analyzed. In this engaging book, Gordon Foxall extends and elaborates his theory of consumer action, based on the philosophical strategy of Intentional Behaviorism. In doing so, he introduces the concept of contingency-representation to explore the ways in which consumers mentally represent the consequences of past decisions and the likely outcomes of present consumption. The emphasis is on action rather than behavior and the manner in which the intentional consumer-situation, as the immediate precursor of consumer choice, can be reconstructed in order to explain consumer actions in the absence of the environmental stimuli required by behaviorist psychology. The result is a novel reaffirmation of the role of cognition in the determination of consumer choice. Besides the concept of contingency-representation which the author introduces, the analysis draws upon psychoanalytic concepts, theories of cognitive structure and processing, and the philosophy of perception to generate a stimulating synthesis for consumer research. The book will be of interest to students and researchers in consumer behavior and economic psychology and to all who seek a deeper interdisciplinary understanding of the contextual and cognitive interactions that guide choice in the market place.