This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.

In the late eighties and early nineties, driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, United States policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community's top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA and DoD instituted policy and organizational changes that altered their relationship with one another. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far. In Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to national intelligence or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.

In this, the first full-length study of the Directorate of Science and Technology, Jeffrey T. Richelson walks us down the corridors of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and through the four decades of science, scientists, and managers that produced the CIA we have today. He tells a story of amazing technological innovation in service of intelligence gathering, of bitter bureaucratic infighting, and sometimes, as in the case of its "mind-control" adventure, of stunning moral failure. Based on original interviews and extensive archival research, The Wizards of Langley turns a piercing lamp on many of the agency's activities, many never before made public.

This book will offer a unique approach to the Year of Intelligence, the sixteen-month period between January 1975 and April 1976 that saw the innermost secrets of various US intelligence agencies laid bare before the world. After allegations of intelligence abuses were made in the press, Congress investigated and revealed numerous cases of unwarranted and unconstitutional activity conducted by a number of intelligence agencies. Chief among the investigations was the Senate enquiry, popularly known as the Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho. This study’s objective is to examine the relationship between national security policy and public opinion using extensive archival evidence, including previously unidentified indicators of public opinion. This monograph makes an important contribution to the historiography of the Church Committee, of public opinion, and of national security policy. The research contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of the Church Committee by challenging the conclusions within the established historiography of the limited impact of the committee’s quest for reform. Furthermore, it widens the very limited scholarship that engages with public opinion’s effect on national security policy. And the project also indicates to policymakers the lessons that can be learnt from the case study, principally, that public opinion is a vital ingredient in the decision making process of successful national security policy.