This paper develops a product cycle model with endogenous and costly innovation, imitation, and foreign direct investment (FDI) to address the concerns of developing nations that stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection would force them to waste scarce resources 'reinventing the wheel.' With stronger IPR protection, multinationals become safer from imitation, but no safer than Northern firms. Imitation becomes a more predominant channel of international technology transfer relative to FDI. Stronger IPR protection displaces FDI due to aggravated resource scarcity in the South. Reduced FDI transmits resource scarcity in the South back to the North and consequently contracts innovation.

This volume collects 30 papers covering channels of international technology transfer; multinational firms, market structure, and welfare; intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment, and innovation; flexibilities contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); exhaustion of intellectual property rights and compulsory licensing of patents; trade, foreign direct investment, and industrial policy; and oligopolistic competition, research and development, and vertical contracts.

International policies toward protecting intellectual property rights have seen profound changes over the past two decades. Rules on how to protect patents, copyright, trademarks and other forms of intellectual property have become a standard component of international trade agreements. Most significantly, during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-94), members of what is today the World Trade Organization (WTO) concluded the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which sets out minimum standards of protection that most of the world's economies have to respect. How will developing countries fare in this new international environment? Intellectual Property and Development brings together empirical research that assesses the effects of changing intellectual property regimes on various measures of economic and social performance - ranging from international trade, foreign investment and competition, to innovation and access to new technologies. The studies presented point to an important development dimension to the protection of intellectual property. But a one-size fits all approach to intellectual property is unlikely to work. There is need to adjust intellectual property norms to domestic needs, taking into account developing countries' capacity to innovate, technological needs, and institutional capabilities. In addition, governments need to consider a range of complementary policies to maximize the benefits and reduce the costs of reformed intellectual property regulations. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of international law, particularly in the area of intellectual property rights, international trade, and public policy.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly being recognized as an important factor in the economic development of countries. This study contains a survey of tax incentive regimes in over 45 countries from all regions of the world. The analysis sheds light on other issues such as design considerations, the importance of proper administration of incentives and measures to increase the efficacy of tax incentives offered. Policy makers will find the study a useful tool in the design, implementation and administration of tax incentives.

There is considerable debate in economics literature on whether a decision by developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) will increase or reduce their access to modern technologies invented by industrial countries. This access can be achieved through technology transfer of various kinds, including foreign direct investment and licensing. Licensing is the focus of this paper. To the extent that inventing firms choose to act more monopolistically and offer fewer technologies on the market, stronger IPRs could reduce international technology flows. However, to the extent that IPRs raise the returns to innovation and licensing, these flows would expand. In theory, the outcome depends on how IPRs affect several variables--the costs of, and returns to, international licensing; the wage advantage of workers in poor countries; the innovation process in industrial countries; and the amount of labor available for innovation and production. Yang and Maskus develop a theoretical model in which firms in the North (industrial countries) innovate products of higher quality levels and decide whether to produce in the North or transfer production rights to the South (developing countries) through licensing. Different quality levels of each product are sold in equilibrium because of differences in consumers' willingness-to-pay for quality improvements. Contracting problems exist because the inventors in the North must indicate to licensees in the South whether their product is of higher or lower quality and also prevent the licensees from copying the technology. So, constraints in the model ensure that the equilibrium flow of licensing higher-quality goods meets these objectives. When the South strengthens its patent rights, copying by licensees is made costlier but the returns to licensing are increased. This change affects the dynamic decisions regarding innovation and technology transfer, which could rise or fall depending on market parameters, including the labor available for research and production. Results from the model show that the net effects depend on the balance between profits made by the Northern licensor and lower labor costs in the South. If the size of the labor force used in Northern innovation compared with that used in producing goods in both the North and South is sufficiently small (a condition that accords with reality), stronger IPRs in the South would lead to more licensing and innovation. This change would also increase the Southern wage relative to the Northern wage. So, in this model a decision by developing countries to increase their patent rights would expand global innovation and increase technology transfer. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence. It should be noted that while the results suggest that international agreements to strengthen IPRs should expand global innovation and technology transfer through licensing, the model cannot be used for welfare analysis. Thus, while the developing countries enjoy more inward licensing, the cost per license could be higher, and prices could also rise, with an unclear overall effect on economic well-being. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of intellectual property rights on economic development.

The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the South is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North innovates new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing a region's welfare change into four components: terms of trade, production composition, available product choice and intertemporal allocation of consumption spending. The paper provides a theoretical evaluation of each one of these components and their relative size. The analysis proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two components. The last two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, the paper considers the role of foreign direct investment.