English summary: Auf privatwirtschaftlich organisierten Krankenversicherungsmarkten wird die Pramie entsprechend des individuellen Risikos erhoben. Verschlechtert sich der Gesundheitszustand einer Person, so besteht die Gefahr, dass die Pramie angehoben wird. Die Person sieht sich einer unsicheren Pramie gegenuber. Mathias Kifmann untersucht, wie dieses Pramienrisiko auf wettbewerblich organisierten Krankenversicherungsmarkten versichert werden kann. Drei grundsatzliche Moglichkeiten der Absicherung werden analysiert und verglichen. In einer vertiefenden theoretischen Analyse untersucht der Autor Reformmoglichkeiten der privaten und der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung. German description: How can it be avoided that consumers face premium risk, i.e. increases in their premiums when their health status deteriorates? Mathias Kifmann examines how this problem which is a major challenge for private health insurance markets can be solved. Three principal ways to insure premium risk which preserve competition among health insurers are analyzed and compared. Guaranteed renewable contracts ensure premiums independent of changes in the health status by requiring a life-time commitment to an insurer. Premium insurance compensates an increase in premiums if the health status changes. Under community rating, the government rules out risk-based premiums by requiring that insurers set a uniform premium for all insured.Mathias Kifmann pays particular attention to the challenges posed by managed care. He argues that managed care can aggravate the lock-in problem under guaranteed renewable contracts. He demonstrates that an alternative contract is superior to guaranteed renewable contracts. This contract creates incentives for insurers to behave in the interest of consumers by specifying payments upon switching to another insurer. If insurers are community-rated, an important question is whether they should be allowed to offer managed care besides traditional health insurance. The author shows that managed care can be used as a pure risk-selection device under community rating. However, the introduction of managed care can also be to the benefit of everyone. To obtain such welfare gains, it may be necessary to tax some insurance plans and to subsidize others.

Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium Regulation in Health Insurance Markets: Theory and Practice describes the goals, design and evaluation of health plan payment systems. Part I contains 5 chapters discussing the role of health plan payment in regulated health insurance markets, key aspects of payment design (i.e. risk adjustment, risk sharing and premium regulation), and evaluation methods using administrative data on medical spending. Part II contains 14 chapters describing the health plan payment system in 14 countries and sectors around the world, including Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, Columbia, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and the United States. Authors discuss the evolution of these payment schemes, along with ongoing reforms and key lessons on the design of health plan payment. Provides a conceptual toolkit that describes the goals, design and evaluation of health plan payment systems in the context of policy paradigms, such as efficiency, affordability, fairness and avoidance of risk selection Brings together international experience from many different countries that apply regulated competition in different ways Delivers a practical toolkit for the evaluation of health plan payment modalities from the standpoint of efficiency and fairness

The United States is unique among economically advanced nations in its reliance on employers to provide health benefits voluntarily for workers and their families. Although it is well known that this system fails to reach millions of these individuals as well as others who have no connection to the work place, the system has other weaknesses. It also has many advantages. Because most proposals for health care reform assume some continued role for employers, this book makes an important contribution by describing the strength and limitations of the current system of employment-based health benefits. It provides the data and analysis needed to understand the historical, social, and economic dynamics that have shaped present-day arrangements and outlines what might be done to overcome some of the access, value, and equity problems associated with current employer, insurer, and government policies and practices. Health insurance terminology is often perplexing, and this volume defines essential concepts clearly and carefully. Using an array of primary sources, it provides a store of information on who is covered for what services at what costs, on how programs vary by employer size and industry, and on what governments doâ€"and do not doâ€"to oversee employment-based health programs. A case study adapted from real organizations' experiences illustrates some of the practical challenges in designing, managing, and revising benefit programs. The sometimes unintended and unwanted consequences of employer practices for workers and health care providers are explored. Understanding the concepts of risk, biased risk selection, and risk segmentation is fundamental to sound health care reform. This volume thoroughly examines these key concepts and how they complicate efforts to achieve efficiency and equity in health coverage and health care. With health care reform at the forefront of public attention, this volume will be important to policymakers and regulators, employee benefit managers and other executives, trade associations, and decisionmakers in the health insurance industry, as well as analysts, researchers, and students of health policy.

Uncertainty about risks to health virtually requires that people have health insurance. But how is the cost of premiums determined? Should rates vary according to some indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the young and the healthy actually subsidize the old and the unhealthy?

Between 1987 and 1991, the portion of Americans covered by individually purchased health insurance dropped 40per cent. Assuming the US will continue to rely on private financing for health care, the author clarifies benefits to society from an efficient health insurance market.