Why were Moro insurgents unable to sustain their authority and legitimacy after gaining access to political power? The study shows how rebels who surrendered their arms in exchange for formal authority were unable to compete with powerful clans and local elites who provided basic security; captured increasing amounts of internal revenue allotments under a regime of devolution; and, enabled the spread of a shadow economy that boosted their power and allowed citizens to secure their livelihoods with little taxation by the state. The implications are quite startling. Political legitimacy is not necessarily about building a strong state, but about weakening it. Legitimacy may be less about building peace, and more about demonstrating an ability to inflict violence. This books is useful to scholars interested in other contexts of insurgency and rebellion, and in understanding the challenges that lie behind sub-national state building and political settlements.

By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew carefully analyze tribal culture and clan associations, examine why "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, identify how these groups recruit, and where they find sanctuary, and dissect the reasoning behind their strategy. Their new introduction evaluates recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing prevalence of Shultz and Dew's conception of irregular warfare, and the Obama Defense Department's approach to fighting insurgents, terrorists, and militias. War in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Bridging two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew recommend how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.

Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive.

India is the world's tenth largest economy and possesses the world's fourth largest military. The subcontinent houses about one-fifth of the world's population and its inhabitants are divided into various tribes, clans and ethnic groups following four great religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Framing the debate using case studies from across the region as well as China, Afghanistan and Burma and using a wealth of primary and secondary sources this incisive volume takes a closer look at the organization and doctrines of the 'shadow armies' and the government forces which fight the former. Arranged in a thematic manner, each chapter critically asks; Why stateless marginal groups rebel? How do states attempt to suppress them? What are the consequences in the aftermath of the conflict especially in relation to conflict resolution and peace building? Unconventional Warfare in South Asia is a welcomed addition to the growing field of interest on civil wars and insurgencies in South Asia. An indispensable read which will allow us to better understand whether South Asia is witnessing a 'New War' and whether the twenty-first century belongs to the insurgents.

" Conventional political theory holds that the sovereign state is the legitimate source of order and provider of public services in any society, whether democratic or not. But Hezbollah and ISIS in the Middle East, pirate clans in Africa, criminal gangs in South America, and militias in Southeast Asia are examples of nonstate actors that control local territory and render public services that the nation-state cannot or will not provide. This fascinating book takes the reader around the world to areas where national governance has broken down—or never really existed. In these places, the vacuum has been filled by local gangs, militias, and warlords, some with ideological or political agendas and others focused primarily on economic gain. Many of these actors have substantial popularity and support among local populations and have developed their own enduring institutions, often undermining the legitimacy of the national state. The authors show that the rest of the world has more than a passing interest in these situations, in part because transborder crime and terrorism often emerge but also because failed states threaten international interests from trade to security. This book also poses, and offers answers for, the question: How should the international community respond to local orders dominated by armed nonstate actors? In many cases outsiders have taken the short-term route—accepting unsavory local actors out of expediency—but at the price of long-term instability or damage to human rights and other considerations. From Africa and the Middle East to Asia and Latin America, the local situations highlighted in this book are, and will remain, high on today's international agenda. The book makes a unique contribution to global understanding of how those situations developed and what can be done about them. This title is part of the Geopolitics in the 21st Century series. "

This is the 52nd volume in the Occasional Paper series of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This paper continues the work begun by Troy Thomas and Stephen Kiser in "Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia" (INSS Occasional Paper 43, May 2002). Inter-state war no longer dominates the landscape of modern conflict. Rather, collective violence and challenges to the international system come increasingly from violent non-state actors (VNSA). With few exceptions, VNSA play a prominent, often destabilizing role in nearly every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international community. The broad spectrum of objectives and asymmetric methods of these contemporary Barbary Pirates fractures traditional conceptions of deterrence and warfighting. The authors contend that deterrence remains a viable strategy for meeting their challenge if adapted to an understanding of VNSA as dynamic biological systems. The prolonged utility of deterrence hinges on insight into VNSA life cycles and a broader conception of the psychology inherent in organizational decision making. Bundled as "broad biological deterrence" (BBD), they develop deterrent strategies that tackle the VNSA threat throughout its life cycle. However, the authors also realize that deterrence may not work in every case. This sets up a counter-VNSA (C-VNSA) strategy that goes beyond coercion to the defeat of the enemy. At its core, their C-VNSA strategy defeats a VNSA by the following: (1) denying the negative entropy, or stores of energy, required to survive attack; and (2) disrupting congruence, or fit, among sub-systems to achieve system failure. By also understanding the indicators of organizational change during its developmental life cycle, preemptory defeat before the VNSA reaches maturity becomes feasible. Their approach allows for measuring campaign progress by assessing changes in VNSA effectiveness.