Since the British withdrew from the subcontinent, nations in the region have been at war with each other. But instead of fighting long-drawnout wars like that between Iran and Iraq, nations of South Asia have sponsored guerrilla armies and armed, trained and equipped them to harass, bleed or embarrass their rivals. The four wars in the region’s post-colonial era were also born out of sponsored guerrilla wars. In 1948 and 1965, Pakistan first tried to have its way in Kashmir by sponsoring irregulars on a large scale and then followed it up with unsuccessful military campaigns aimed at ensuring the state’s secession from India. In 1962, China attacked India not so much over a disputed border or India’s much publicized Forward Policy but essentially in response to what it felt was a joint Indo-US covert effort in Tibet. In 1971 India rounded off its successful sponsorship of the Bengali guerrilla struggle in erstwhile East Pakistan by a speedy military campaign that resulted in the break up of Pakistan. Insurgent Crossfire examines the origins of sponsored insurgencies and how they have shaped South Asia’s tense diplomatic environment. Having done that, it studies the major sponsored guerrilla campaigns in South Asia and then seeks a detailed case study of the phenomenon by focusing on the far eastern slice of the subcontinent. The author argues that this region, with its multitude of tribes and battling ethnicities, has been the most durable theatre of insurgent crossfire – in which nations like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China (a major actor in South Asian politics) have backed insurgencies against each other.

Since the British withdrew from the subcontinent, nations in the region have been at war with each other. But instead of fighting long-drawnout wars like that between Iran and Iraq, nations of South Asia have sponsored guerrilla armies and armed, trained and equipped them to harass, bleed or embarrass their rivals. The four wars in the region’s post-colonial era were also born out of sponsored guerrilla wars. In 1948 and 1965, Pakistan first tried to have its way in Kashmir by sponsoring irregulars on a large scale and then followed it up with unsuccessful military campaigns aimed at ensuring the state’s secession from India. In 1962, China attacked India not so much over a disputed border or India’s much publicized Forward Policy but essentially in response to what it felt was a joint Indo-US covert effort in Tibet. In 1971 India rounded off its successful sponsorship of the Bengali guerrilla struggle in erstwhile East Pakistan by a speedy military campaign that resulted in the break up of Pakistan. Insurgent Crossfire examines the origins of sponsored insurgencies and how they have shaped South Asia’s tense diplomatic environment. Having done that, it studies the major sponsored guerrilla campaigns in South Asia and then seeks a detailed case study of the phenomenon by focusing on the far eastern slice of the subcontinent. The author argues that this region, with its multitude of tribes and battling ethnicities, has been the most durable theatre of insurgent crossfire – in which nations like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China (a major actor in South Asian politics) have backed insurgencies against each other.

In an unprecedented show of force, organization and skill, two proscribed Islamist militant organizations exploded more than 450 bombs within a span of less than an hour throughout Bangladesh on 17 August 2005 sending a strong message that they were a force to be reckoned with. This catastrophic event, followed by a number of suicide attacks, forced the then reluctant Bangladeshi government, a coalition of center-right parties with two Islamists among them, to acknowledge the existence of a network of militants and take action against this threat. Against this backdrop, this book is the first academic study on the growing Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. It examines the relevance, significance and trajectories of militant Islamist groups in Bangladesh, exploring the complex web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics that have both engendered and strengthened Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. The three factors - domestic, regional and international aspects - are each discussed separately and their connection and links are analyzed. It goes on to consider possible future trajectories of militant Islamism in Bangladesh. This book addresses an issue of great importance for contemporary Bangladeshi politics, and will be of interest to scholars of international politics and security studies, including terrorism and the politics of South Asia.

This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.

The author has discussed six insurgencies that have taken roots in India from its inception. He has gone into the details of its causes and spread as relevant to various insurgencies in different parts of India. The author has supported most of the reasons of its spread with his personal experience, having served in various capacities in these affected areas. Many scholars have written about the causes that lead to insurgencies all over the world, lessons learnt by them and remedial measures adopted by them. Regrettably, the author feels we did not learn any lessons from these. Our oldest insurgency of the Nagas in Nagaland and the Manipur Hills is still festering though ten years of a ceasefire has led to no conclusions. In Kashmir it is the Centre that triggered off the insurgency that Pakistan had failed to initiate on several occasions from 1947 to 1989. Good governance has never been achieved in any of these insurgent states with the sole exception of Tripura. We are in the throes of a Maoist Communist led insurgency in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and part of Maharashtra. All this has been discussed in the book in detail.

This book, based on extensive field research, examines the Indian state’s response to the multiple insurgencies that have occurred since independence in 1947. In reacting to these various insurgencies, the Indian state has employed a combined approach of force, dialogue, accommodation of ethnic and minority aspirations and, overtime, the state has established a tradition of negotiation with armed ethnic groups in order to bolster its legitimacy based on an accommodative posture. While these efforts have succeeded in resolving the Mizo insurgency, it has only incited levels of violence with regard to others. Within this backdrop of ongoing Indian counter-insurgency, this study provides a set of conditions responsible for the groundswell of insurgencies in India, and some recommendations to better formulate India’s national security policy with regard to its counter-insurgency responses. The study focuses on the national institutions responsible for formulating India’s national security policy dealing with counter-insurgency – such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Committee on Security, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian military apparatus. Furthermore, it studies how national interests and values influence the formulation of this policy; and the overall success and/or failure of the policy to deal with armed insurgent movements. Notably, the study traces the ideational influence of Kautilya and Gandhi in India’s overall response to insurgencies. Multiple cases of armed ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland in the Northeast of India and the ideologically oriented Maoist or Naxalite insurgency affecting the heartland of India are analysed in-depth to evaluate the Indian counter-insurgency experience. This book will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgency, Asian politics, ethnic conflict, and security studies in general.