This book examines the behavior of individuals at risk and insurance industry policy makers involved in selling, buying and regulation.

Presenting theoretical foundations and empirical research, this text introduces the reader to the core issues and analytical tools of insurance economics, examining in detail a host of key factors including supply and demand, regulation and social insurance.

The theory of insurance is presented in this book, discussed from the viewpoint of the theory of economics of uncertainty. The principle of premium calculation which the book uses is based on economic equilibrium theory and differs from many of the premium systems discussed by actuaries.Reinsurance is developed in the framework of general economic equilibrium theory under uncertainty. Here ordering of risks, preferences and utility theory play an important role. The book discusses the markets for insurance and divides them into three classes: (i) life insurance (ii) business insurance and (iii) household insurance, and these classes are each treated extensively in three separate chapters. Finally uninsurable risks are presented under "asymmetric information". Here moral hazard and adverse selection are treated and illustrations are given, some based on game theory.

Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

The book brings together academics, regulators, and industry experts to provide a multifaceted array of research and perspectives on insurance, its role and functioning, and the potential systemic risk it could create.

Written for advanced undergraduate and master’s level courses, this book builds from a base of asymmetric information issues to discuss a wide array of topics and is illustrated with some timely examples. Covers diverse issues such as risk aversion, expected utility, and moral hazard within the pure theory of insurance Provides a clear exposition of the necessary mathematics, a feature which cannot be found in readers on the topic Utilizes an undergraduate economics major level of math Uses the simplest economic models possible to keep the text intuitive Introduces more mathematically complex techniques such as basic optimization for students wishing to 'go further' in their analysis

Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice