If the costs of the Vietnam War were great to Americans and staggering to the South Vietnamese, they were even worse for the North. And those costs were borne largely by the individual soldiers—the soldiers who won the war. Based on interviews, soldiers’ diaries, letters, and government documents, this book, first published in 1992, gives a classic, soldier’s-eye account of the war our opponents fought and the men who fought it.

During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong (VC) main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were forced to hide weapons and supplies underground and to dig protective shelters to counter massive US firepower. Their field works defended villages, hidden base camps, and fortified complexes, and took the form of trench systems, individual fighting positions, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, caches, and extensive tunnel complexes. Camouflage and deceptive measures, and the employment of obstacles and booby traps, went hand-in-hand with such works. This title takes a detailed look at the VC/NVA tunnel systems, field fortifications, base camps. and camouflage and concealment measures employed during the Vietnam conflict.

In 1965, despite pronounced disadvantages in firepower and mobility, the Communist Vietnamese endeavored to crush South Vietnam and expel the American military with a strategy for a quick and decisive victory predicated not on guerrilla but big-unit war. Warren Wilkins chronicles the formation, development, and participation of the Viet Cong in the opening phase of the big-unit war and shows how the failure of that strategy profoundly influenced the decision to launch the Tet Offensive. Unlike most books on the war, this one provides an authentic account from the Communist perspective, wi ...

Commonly mistaken for the locally raised Viet Cong, the NVA was an entirely different force, conducting large-scale operations in a conventional war. Despite limited armour, artillery and air support, the NVA were an extremely politicized and professional force with strict control measures and leadership concepts. Gordon Rottman follows the fascinating life of the highly motivated infantryman from conscription and induction through training to real combat experiences. Covering the evolution of the forces from 1958 onwards, this book takes an in-depth look at the civilian and military lives of the soldiers, whilst accompanying artwork details the uniforms, weapons and equipment used by the NVA in their clash against America and her allies.

In 1940 Japan placed Vietnam under military occupation, restricting the local French administration to a figurehead authority. Seizing the opportunity, the Communists organised a Vietnamese independence league, the Viet Minh, whose armed forces became known as the PAVN (more commonly known to the West as the Vietcong, or NVA) and prepared to launch an uprising against the French at the war's end. This text details the history, organisation and uniforms of the People's Army of Vietnam from its origins in the fight against colonialism, through two separate wars against the US and Khmer Rouge, to its role in the modern era.

Here is real story of North Vietnam's armed forces. Lanning served as a platoon leader and company commander in Vietnam, and as public affairs officer for General Schwartzkopf. Now he and Cragg, a sergeant-major who served five years in Vietnam, tell how the communists won that conflict by using the individual soldier.

The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.