He is living what many would call a nightmare. John Weaver is serving God in a war-torn country that is being blamed for the terrorist acts on American soil. Despite the fact that every day is dangerous and possibly life-threatening, John Weaver believes he sees God at work in Afghanistan and he is optimistic about its spiritual future. Inside Afghanistan is the story of the Taliban and September 11, as only this servant of God can tell it. John Weaver was there as the last American aid worker in the hostile country he now calls home. He is witness to God's ability to use ordinary Christians in the U.S. to "spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ to a country that otherwise wouldn't have had the opportunity." This is John Weaver's riveting account of why he went and why he wouldn't leave.

American and Afghan veterans contribute to this anthology of critical perspectives—“a vital contribution toward understanding the Afghanistan War” (Library Journal). When America went to war with Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, it did so with the lofty goals of dismantling al Qaeda, removing the Taliban from power, remaking the country into a democracy. But as the mission came unmoored from reality, the United States wasted billions of dollars, and thousands of lives were lost. Our Latest Longest War is a chronicle of how, why, and in what ways the war in Afghanistan failed. Edited by prize-winning historian and Marine lieutenant colonel Aaron B. O’Connell, the essays collected here represent nine different perspectives on the war—all from veterans of the conflict, both American and Afghan. Together, they paint a picture of a war in which problems of culture, including an unbridgeable rural-urban divide, derailed nearly every field of endeavor. The authors also draw troubling parallels to the Vietnam War, arguing that ideological currents in American life explain why the US government has repeatedly used military force in pursuit of democratic nation-building. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, this created a dramatic mismatch of means and ends that neither money, technology, nor weapons could overcome.

Modern warfare is almost always multilateral to one degree or another, requiring countries to cooperate as allies or coalition partners. Yet as the war in Afghanistan has made abundantly clear, multilateral cooperation is neither straightforward nor guaranteed. Countries differ significantly in what they are willing to do and how and where they are willing to do it. Some refuse to participate in dangerous or offensive missions. Others change tactical objectives with each new commander. Some countries defer to their commanders while others hold them to strict account. NATO in Afghanistan explores how government structures and party politics in NATO countries shape how battles are waged in the field. Drawing on more than 250 interviews with senior officials from around the world, David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman find that domestic constraints in presidential and single-party parliamentary systems--in countries such as the United States and Britain respectively--differ from those in countries with coalition governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands. As a result, different countries craft different guidelines for their forces overseas, most notably in the form of military caveats, the often-controversial limits placed on deployed troops. Providing critical insights into the realities of alliance and coalition warfare, NATO in Afghanistan also looks at non-NATO partners such as Australia, and assesses NATO's performance in the 2011 Libyan campaign to show how these domestic political dynamics are by no means unique to Afghanistan.

A thrilling true story of courage and duty after 9/11—“an extraordinary read from cover to cover . . . Gritty, frustrating, brutal, exhilarating” (Midwest Book Review). Within hours after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, ex-Green Beret Duane Evans began a personal quest to become part of the US response against al-Qa’ida. His determination led him to join one of the CIAs elite teams bound for Afghanistan. It was a journey that eventually took him to the front lines in Pakistan—first as part of the advanced element of a CIA group supporting President Hamid Karzai, and finally as leader of the under-resourced and often overlooked Foxtrot team. Evans’s mission was to venture into southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban and al-Qa’ida held sway, and try to organize a cohesive resistance among the fractious warlords and tribal leaders. He traveled in the company of Pashtun warriors—one of only a handful of Americans pushing forward across the desert into some of the most dangerous, yet mesmerizingly beautiful, landscape on earth. Brilliantly crafted and fast-paced, Foxtrot in Kandahar “dramatically reports the huge challenges and exceptional success of [Evans’s] and his brothers’ work in Afghanistan defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in nine weeks” (Ambassador Cofer Black, former director, Counterterrorist Center, CIA).

Afghanistan has been a theatre of civil and international conflict for much of the twentieth century – stability is essential if there is to be peace in the Greater Middle East. Yet policy-makers in the West often seem to forget the lessons learned from previous administrations, whose interventions have contributed to the instability in the region. Here, Sharifullah Dorani focuses on the process of decision-making, looking at which factors influenced American policy-makers in the build-up to its longest war, the Afghanistan War, and how reactions on the ground in Afghanistan have influenced events since then. America in Afghanistan is a new, full history of US foreign policy toward Afghanistan from Bush's 'War on Terror', to Obama's war of 'Countering Violent Extremism' to Trump's war against 'Radical Islamic Terrorism'. Dorani is fluent in Pashto and Dari and uses unique and unseen Afghan source-work, published here for the first time, to understand the people in Afghanistan itself, and to answer their unanswered questions about 'real' US Afghan goals, the reasons for US failures in Afghanistan, especially its inability to improve governance and stop Pakistan, Iran and Russia from supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the reasons for the bewildering changes in US Afghan policy over the course of 16 and a half years. To that end the author also assesses Presidents Karzai and Ghani's responses to Bush, Obama and Trump's policies in Afghanistan and the region. In addition, the book covers the role Afghanistan's neighbours – Russia, Iran, India, and especially Pakistan – played in America's Afghanistan War. This will be an essential book for those interested in the future of the region, and those who seek to understand its recent past.

The United Nations mediator for the Afghanistan conflict and a foreign policy analyst provide their own interpretations of the negotiations that helped to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They describe how the ideological hard line taken by the Reagan administration prolonged the conflict.

The war in Afghanistan has run for more than a decade, and NATO has become increasingly central to it. In this book, Sten Rynning examines NATO's role in the campaign and the difficult diplomacy involved in fighting a war by alliance. He explores the history of the war and its changing momentum, and explains how NATO at first faltered but then improved its operations to become a critical enabler for the U.S. surge of 2009. However, he also uncovers a serious and enduring problem for NATO in the shape of a disconnect between high liberal hopes for the new Afghanistan and a lack of realism about the military campaign prosecuted to bring it about. He concludes that, while NATO has made it to the point in Afghanistan where the war no longer has the potential to break it, the alliance is, at the same time, losing its own struggle to define itself as a vigorous and relevant entity on the world stage. To move forward, he argues, NATO allies must recover their common purpose as a Western alliance, and he outlines options for change.