The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the South is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North innovates new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing a region's welfare change into four components: terms of trade, production composition, available product choice and intertemporal allocation of consumption spending. The paper provides a theoretical evaluation of each one of these components and their relative size. The analysis proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two components. The last two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, the paper considers the role of foreign direct investment.

This paper sets up a vertically related market model in which imitation and innovation are endogenously determined to study the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on less-developed countries. It shows how a less-developed country switches from imitation to innovation as it develops. It is also found that the relationship between IPR protection and economic development is -shaped. The IPR protection tends to go down and then go up as income rises. This finding also conforms with that in the empirical literature on IPR protection.

This paper extends the established Helpman (1993) model by introducing international capital movement, and obtains new results concerning the welfare implications of tightening intellectual property rights (IPR) in the South. First, if separated capital markets in the North and the South are integrated, enforcement of IPR would have more desirable welfare effects in both regions. Second, when international capital movement is allowed, the North always gains from the tightening of IPR if the imitation rate is sufficiently high. This implies that the North's demand on the South to tighten IPR becomes stronger as the integration of international capital markets progresses.

There is considerable debate in economics literature on whether a decision by developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) will increase or reduce their access to modern technologies invented by industrial countries. This access can be achieved through technology transfer of various kinds, including foreign direct investment and licensing. Licensing is the focus of this paper. To the extent that inventing firms choose to act more monopolistically and offer fewer technologies on the market, stronger IPRs could reduce international technology flows. However, to the extent that IPRs raise the returns to innovation and licensing, these flows would expand. In theory, the outcome depends on how IPRs affect several variables--the costs of, and returns to, international licensing; the wage advantage of workers in poor countries; the innovation process in industrial countries; and the amount of labor available for innovation and production. Yang and Maskus develop a theoretical model in which firms in the North (industrial countries) innovate products of higher quality levels and decide whether to produce in the North or transfer production rights to the South (developing countries) through licensing. Different quality levels of each product are sold in equilibrium because of differences in consumers' willingness-to-pay for quality improvements. Contracting problems exist because the inventors in the North must indicate to licensees in the South whether their product is of higher or lower quality and also prevent the licensees from copying the technology. So, constraints in the model ensure that the equilibrium flow of licensing higher-quality goods meets these objectives. When the South strengthens its patent rights, copying by licensees is made costlier but the returns to licensing are increased. This change affects the dynamic decisions regarding innovation and technology transfer, which could rise or fall depending on market parameters, including the labor available for research and production. Results from the model show that the net effects depend on the balance between profits made by the Northern licensor and lower labor costs in the South. If the size of the labor force used in Northern innovation compared with that used in producing goods in both the North and South is sufficiently small (a condition that accords with reality), stronger IPRs in the South would lead to more licensing and innovation. This change would also increase the Southern wage relative to the Northern wage. So, in this model a decision by developing countries to increase their patent rights would expand global innovation and increase technology transfer. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence. It should be noted that while the results suggest that international agreements to strengthen IPRs should expand global innovation and technology transfer through licensing, the model cannot be used for welfare analysis. Thus, while the developing countries enjoy more inward licensing, the cost per license could be higher, and prices could also rise, with an unclear overall effect on economic well-being. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of intellectual property rights on economic development.

Following decades in which China's approach to technology has been to imitate, the country is now transforming itself to become innovation-oriented. This pioneering study examines whether patents play a similar role in promoting innovation in China as they do in the West, exploring the interplay between patents and China's biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in particular.

We study how uncompensated research and development (R&D) spillovers - the leakage of proprietary information through imitation or theft - affect firms' investment decisions. Using variation in property rights protections across different regions within China we find that 1) uncompensated spillovers are greater in regions with weaker property rights, 2) such spillovers are associated with lower R&D expenditures, and 3) the latter is exacerbated in low property rights regimes. In addition to identifying a specific channel through which legal protections affect incentives for innovation and R&D, our results support arguments in the literature that the enforcement of property rights affects firm investment and growth.

As technological developments multiply around the globeâ€"even as the patenting of human genes comes under serious discussionâ€"nations, companies, and researchers find themselves in conflict over intellectual property rights (IPRs). Now, an international group of experts presents the first multidisciplinary look at IPRs in an age of explosive growth in science and technology. This thought-provoking volume offers an update on current international IPR negotiations and includes case studies on software, computer chips, optoelectronics, and biotechnologyâ€"areas characterized by high development cost and easy reproducibility. The volume covers these and other issues: Modern economic theory as a basis for approaching international IPRs. U.S. intellectual property practices versus those in Japan, India, the European Community, and the developing and newly industrializing countries. Trends in science and technology and how they affect IPRs. Pros and cons of a uniform international IPRs regime versus a system reflecting national differences.