Information technology is a powerful tool for meeting environmental objectives and promoting sustainable development. This collection of papers by leaders in industry, government, and academia explores how information technology can improve environmental performance by individual firms, collaborations among firms, and collaborations among firms, government agencies, and academia. Information systems can also be used by nonprofit organizations and the government to inform the public about broad environmental issues and environmental conditions in their neighborhoods. Several papers address the challenges to information management posed by the explosive increase in information and knowledge about environmental issues and potential solutions, including determining what information is environmentally relevant and how it can be used in decision making. In addition, case studies are described and show how industry is using information systems to ensure sustainable development and meet environmental standards. The book also includes examples from the public sector showing how governments use information knowledge systems to disseminate "best practices" beyond big firms to small businesses, and from the world of the Internet showing how knowledge is shared among environmental advocates and the general public.

The attacks on 9/11 underscored the fed. government¿s need to facilitate terrorism-related info. sharing among gov¿t., private sector, and foreign stakeholders. In response, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act mandated the creation of the Info. Sharing Environment (ISE), which is an approach for the sharing of terrorism-related info. A Program Manager oversees ISE development with assistance from the Info. Sharing Council, a forum for 16 info. sharing officials from fed. agencies and dep¿ts. This is a report on: (1) what actions have been taken to guide the design and implementation of the ISE; and (2) what efforts have been made to report on progress in implementing the ISE. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.

This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.

This guide examines the use of technology for sharing information, both within an organisation, and between companies and their clients and customers. It looks in particular at the use of push/ pull technologies for delivering current awareness services. The guide also discusses the pros and cons of the technology, particularly information overload, and suggests a number of ways of minimising the problems. The guide contains a useful list of books, reports, journals and other information sources. Contents: Introduction; Intranets; Extranets; Groupware; Case studies; Push/pull technologies; Information overload; Key players; Useful information sources; References; Further reading.

In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.