This book presents recent developments in the economics of asymmetric information. The problems of selection and moral hazard, with hidden actions or hidden information, are introduced by examining how they affect the market for investment finance. The ideas are then used to analyse the market for insurance, signalling and screening models of education, efficiency wages, industrial regulation, public procurement and auctions. Coverage is thorough while avoiding excessive mathematical detail. Diagrams and verbal reasoning make the ideas accessible to intermediate level undergraduate students and beyond.

The IFIP series publishes state-of-the-art results in the sciences and technologies of information and communication Proceedings and post-proceedings of referred international conferences in computer science and interdisciplinary fields are featured. These results often precede journal publication and represent the most current research. The principal aim of the IFIP series is to encourage education and the dissemination and exchange of information about all aspects of computing.

The issue of asymmetric information and public decision-making has been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take account of the different incentive problems arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed, mainly employing the principal agent paradigm to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organizations. Still, this analysis is under way in many fields of public economics. However, a debate is ongoing on the theoretical limitations of this approach and on its relevance for the actual public sector activities. Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organization of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away. Once the need for an incomplete contracting approach is recognized, the question becomes how to relax some of the assumptions characterizing the complete contracting framework, without getting ad hoc results. The Introduction to this book, written by Jean Jacques Laffont, sets the general grid to interpret the position of its papers in this debate. The four papers in Part 1 of the book are devoted to developing the analysis of some of the theoretical issues mentioned in the Introduction. Part 2 is devoted to discussing the applications of the theory to different public sector activities.

Advertising is a company’s major form of communication with the market; it is a component of the IMC system, having a special impact on the addressee, and is a form of persuasive communication affecting consumer behaviour. Advertising may reflect information asymmetry between an advertiser and recipients. This book presents an assessment of the forms and range of consumer behaviour manipulation through information asymmetry in online advertising and explores the possible causes, forms, and effects. The work offers a new approach to the role of advertising in the digital world, especially its forms and impact strategies. The theoretical framework presented is based on issues related to online advertising, information asymmetry, and social manipulation. The book describes the ways in which these areas can be explored, and it presents the results of empirical studies. Empirical research allows for identifying companies’ moral hazard strategies and their consequences – e-consumers’ adverse selection. The research provides an empirical answer to the question: to what extent is advertising a transparent form of communication, and to what extent does it represent the world of manipulation? Based on an interdisciplinary theoretical approach, empirical studies conducted by the authors, and theoretical and managerial implication, the book encourages its readers to find their own answers. Given the interdisciplinary nature of this work, it will be of interest to scholars and researchers within the fields of marketing, media and communication, economics, psychology, sociology, and ethics.

Asymmetric information (the fact that borrowers have better information than their lenders) and its theoretical and practical evidence now forms part of the basic tool kit of every financial economist. It is a phenomenon that has major implications for a number of economic and financial issues ranging from both micro and macroeconomic level - corporate debt, investment and dividend policies, the depth and duration of business cycles, the rate of long term economic growth - to the origin of financial and international crises. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets aims to explain this concept in an accessible way, without jargon and by reducing mathematical complexity. Using elementary algebra and statistics, graphs, and convincing real-world evidence, the author explores the foundations of the problems posed by asymmetries of information in a refreshingly accessible and intuitive way.

This book gathers concepts of information across diverse fields –physics, electrical engineering and computational science – surveying current theories, discussing underlying notions of symmetry, and showing how the capacity of a system to distinguish itself relates to information. The author develops a formal methodology using group theory, leading to the application of Burnside's Lemma to count distinguishable states. This provides a tool to quantify complexity and information capacity in any physical system.

The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.