This paper quantitatively assesses the effects of inflation shocks on the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 19 advanced economies using simulation and estimation approaches. The simulations based on the debt dynamics equation and estimations of impulse responses by local projections both suggest that a 1 percentage point shock to inflation rate reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 0.5 to 1 percentage points. The results also suggest that the impact is larger and more persistent when the debt maturity is longer, but the difference from the benchmark case is not significant. These results imply that modestly higher inflation, even if accompanied by some financial repression, could reduce public debt burden only marginally in many advanced economies.

This paper investigates the impact of low or high inflation on the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the G-7 countries. Our simulations suggest that if inflation were to fall to zero for five years, the average net debt-to-GDP ratio would increase by about 5 percentage points over the next five years. In contrast, raising inflation to 6 percent for the next five years would reduce the average net debt-to-GDP ratio by about 11 percentage points under the full Fisher effect and about 14 percentage points under the partial Fisher effect. Thus higher inflation could help reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio somewhat in advanced economies. However, it could hardly solve the debt problem on its own and would raise significant challenges and risks. First of all, it may be difficult to create higher inflation, as evidenced by Japan’s experience in the last few decades. In addition, un-anchoring of inflation expectations could increase long-term real interest rates, distort resource allocation, reduce economic growth, and hurt the lower–income households.

This paper examines whether high government debt levels pose a challenge to containing inflation. It does so by assessing the impact of government debt surprises on inflation expectations in advanced- and emerging market economies. It finds that debt surprises raise long-term inflation expectations in emerging market economies in a persistent way, but not in advanced economies. The effects are stronger when initial debt levels are already high, when inflation levels are initially high, and when debt dollarization is significant. By contrast, debt surprises have only modest effects in economies with inflation targeting regimes. Increased debt levels may complicate the fight against inflation in emerging market economies with high and dollarized debt levels, and weaker monetary policy frameworks.

This paper quantitatively assesses the effects of inflation shocks on the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 19 advanced economies using simulation and estimation approaches. The simulations based on the debt dynamics equation and estimations of impulse responses by local projections both suggest that a 1 percentage point shock to inflation rate reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 0.5 to 1 percentage points. The results also suggest that the impact is larger and more persistent when the debt maturity is longer, but the difference from the benchmark case is not significant. These results imply that modestly higher inflation, even if accompanied by some financial repression, could reduce public debt burden only marginally in many advanced economies.

task has become particularly challenging in European advanced economies where expectations of low growth and limits to monetary policy support are shifting the burden of adjustment onto fiscal consolidation. The SDN will investigate the main drivers behind successful past debt reversals, focusing on macroeconomic and financial market conditions, the speed and form of fiscal adjustment, and the institutional policy setting, among other things. Its policy conclusions will depend on the emerging stylized facts but are likely to include considerations on the design and pace of fiscal consolidation, taking into account country-specific as well as regional economic, institutional, and political factors.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

Countries have significantly increased their public-sector borrowing since the Global Financial Crisis. As a consequence, monetary authorities may face pressure to deviate from their policy targets in ways designed to ease the debt burden. In this context, we test for greater fiscal dominance over 2000-2017 under Inflation Targeting (IT) and non-IT regimes. We find that evidence consistent with fiscal dominance varies across countries and debt configurations. Higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP may appear associated with lower policy interest rates in advanced economies. However, a declining natural rate of interest largely explains the pattern of lower rates and higher debt in these countries. The most robust evidence of fiscal dominance lies among emerging markets under non-IT regimes, composed mostly of exchange rate targeters. For these countries, policy interest rates are non-linearly associated with public debt levels, depending on both the level of hard-currency public debt-to-GDP and the currency composition of public debt. We also show that emerging market economies with greater exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and underlying commodity exposure exhibit stronger associations between public debt and policy interest rates.