In Chinese Economic Statecraft, William J. Norris introduces an innovative theory that pinpoints how states employ economic tools of national power to pursue their strategic objectives. Norris shows what Chinese economic statecraft is, how it works, and why it is more or less effective. Norris provides an accessible tool kit to help us better understand important economic developments in the People's Republic of China. He links domestic Chinese political economy with the international ramifications of China’s economic power as a tool for realizing China’s strategic foreign policy interests. He presents a novel approach to studying economic statecraft that calls attention to the central challenge of how the state is (or is not) able to control and direct the behavior of economic actors.Norris identifies key causes of Chinese state control through tightly structured, substate and crossnational comparisons of business-government relations. These cases range across three important arenas of China’s grand strategy that prominently feature a strategic role for economics: China’s efforts to secure access to vital raw materials located abroad, Mainland relations toward Taiwan, and China’s sovereign wealth funds. Norris spent more than two years conducting field research in China and Taiwan during which he interviewed current and former government officials, academics, bankers, journalists, advisors, lawyers, and businesspeople. The ideas in this book are applicable beyond China and help us to understand how states exercise international economic power in the twenty-first century.

Analyzing the American intelligence network, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution Angelo Codevilla concludes that American intelligence efforts are desperately outdated in this “masterful exploration of the field” (Publishers Weekly). Based on years of research and experience working within the American intelligence network, Angelo Codevilla argues that the intelligence efforts of the nation’s government are outgrown and inconclusive. Suggesting that the evolution of American intelligence since the Vietnam War and World War II has been erratic and unplanned, Codevilla presents new efforts to be made within the intelligence network that would lead to strategized and effective methods of information gathering. Connecting the lines between a need for successful intelligence efforts and a strong government, Informing Statecraft warns of how intelligence failures of the past will eventually pale in comparison to the malaise that plagued American intelligence in the twentieth century.

A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2016 Today, nations increasingly carry out geopolitical combat through economic means. Policies governing everything from trade and investment to energy and exchange rates are wielded as tools to win diplomatic allies, punish adversaries, and coerce those in between. Not so in the United States, however. America still too often reaches for the gun over the purse to advance its interests abroad. The result is a playing field sharply tilting against the United States. “Geoeconomics, the use of economic instruments to advance foreign policy goals, has long been a staple of great-power politics. In this impressive policy manifesto, Blackwill and Harris argue that in recent decades, the United States has tended to neglect this form of statecraft, while China, Russia, and other illiberal states have increasingly employed it to Washington’s disadvantage.” —G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs “A readable and lucid primer...The book defines the extensive topic and opens readers’ eyes to its prevalence throughout history...[Presidential] candidates who care more about protecting American interests would be wise to heed the advice of War by Other Means and take our geoeconomic toolkit more seriously. —Jordan Schneider, Weekly Standard

Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do. A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair. The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change. The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.

In retelling the story of the Radical Alexander Hamilton, Parenti rewrites the history early America and global economic history writ large. For much of the twentieth century, Hamilton - sometimes seen as the bad boy of the founding fathers or portrayed as the patron saint of bankers- was out of fashion. In contrast his rival Thomas Jefferson, the patrician democrat and slave owner who feared government overreach, was claimed by all. But more recently, Hamilton has become a subject of serious interest again. He was a contradictory mix: a tough soldier, austere workaholic, exacting bureaucrat, yet also a sexual libertine, and a glory-obsessed romantic with suicidal tendencies. As Parenti argues, we have yet to fully appreciate Hamilton as the primary architect of American capitalism and the developmental state. In exploring his life and work, Parenti rediscovers this gadfly as a path breaking political thinker and institution builder. In this vivid historical portrait, Hamilton emerges as a singularly important historical figure: a thinker and politico who laid the foundation for America's ascent to global supremacy - for better or worse.

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.