The genesis of this conference was on a quay of the port of Bergen in March 1985. Ragnar Amason suggested to Phil Neher a small, mid-Atlantic conference on recent developments in fishery management. In the event, more than twenty papers were scheduled and over one hundred and fifty conferees were registered. Logistical complications were sorted through for a summer 1988 conference in Iceland. The really innovative management programs were in the South Pacific; Aus tralia and New Zealand had introduced Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs); and Iceland, Norway and Canada were also experimenting with quotas. It seemed to the program committee (Rognvaldur Hannesson and Geoffrey Waugh were soon on board) that these quotas had more or less characteristics of property rights. Property rights were also taking other forms in other places (time and area licenses, restrictive licensing of vessels and gear, traditional use rights). The idea of rights based fishing became the theme of the conference.

Report of twenty-three studies looking at the UK, The Netherlands, Iceland, Canada, New Zealand, United States, Australia, Alaska and Chile.

A proposal for a new global approach for fisheries focused on reducing fishing capacity and providing incentives for long-term sustainability. The Earth's oceans are overfished, despite more than fifty years of cooperation among the world's fishing nations. There are too many boats chasing too few fish. In Saving Global Fisheries, J. Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth DeSombre analyze the problem of overfishing and offer a provocative proposal for a global regulatory and policy approach. Existing patterns of international fisheries management try to limit the number of fish that can be caught while governments simultaneously subsidize increased fishing capacity, focusing on fisheries as an industry to be developed rather than on fish as a resource to be conserved. Regionally based international management means that protection in one area simply shifts fishing efforts to other species or regions. Barkin and DeSombre argue that global rather than regional regulation is necessary for successful fisheries management and emphasize the need to reduce subsidies. They propose an international system of individual transferable quotas that would give holders of permits an interest in the long-term health of fish stocks and help create a sustainable level of fishing capacity globally.

Why exclusive use rights -- in particular, individual transferable quotas -- provide the most efficient way to use fishing resources; theory plus case studies of ITQs in six countries.

In this monograph, Professor Gissurarson explains the Icelandic model of fisheries management, Individual Transferable Share Quotas (ITQs), implemented in 1979 to reverse the decline in Icelandic fish stocks. Access to Icelandic fisheries was traditionally open to all. In the 1960s and 1970s excessive catches of herring and then cod led to a decline in stocks of these important species in Iceland's waters. In response, Iceland's government imposed restrictions on the number of days trawlers could put to sea to catch certain species. This led to fishing Derbies, where fishermen competed to catch as many fish as possible in the limited time available. Inevitably, catches continued to exceed sustainable levels. Starting in 1979, the Icelandic government gradually introduced a system of individual transferable share quotas (ITQs), which essentially give boat owners the right to catch a specific proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC) of certain species. If a boat owner does not wish to use all his ITQ he can sell part of it to someone else. This encourages more efficient use of the capital invested in boats and equipment. Because ITQs entitle their owners to a specific share of the future stock of fish, they create incentives to ensure that stocks are sustainable. Since the introduction of ITQs, capital invested in Icelandic fisheries (boats and equipment) has been gradually falling and catches have fallen to sustainable levels, whilst the value of catches has risen. Because of the success of the ITQ system and the wealth it has created, there is now political pressure for an imposition of a resource rent tax. But such a tax would be contrary to the interests of effective conservation of fish stocks. A more appropriate next step would be to introduce a cost-recovery charge and, as a quid pro quo, give ITQ owners greater say in the administration and enforcement of the system. Owners of ITQ would have stronger incentives to ensure that catch levels were set at the economically optimal level.