This three-volume handbook includes state-of-the-art surveys in different areas of neoclassical production economics. Volumes 1 and 2 cover theoretical and methodological issues only. Volume 3 includes surveys of empirical applications in different areas like manufacturing, agriculture, banking, energy and environment, and so forth.

The overutilization of fish stocks, the overcapitalization of fisheries, the removal of associated benefits to society and growing concern over the conservation of marine biodiversity have resulted in a line of fisheries research that is multidisciplinary, dynamic and precautionary in approach. All the biological, ecological and economic factors need to be analysed if the forces regulating the dynamics of a fishery are to be appraised. This publication looks at the assumptions underlying the optimal allocation of renewable natural resources; lists the bioeconomic points of reference resulting from analysis of fisheries is supposed conditions of equilibrium; analysis bioeconomic models according to ecological interdependence factors (such as competition and predation) and technological factors (such as competition between fleets with different fishing capacity); offers a time-series analysis of fisheries and estimates the level of optimal effort; proposes mathematical models applied to bioeconomic analysis to support fisheries management plans; refutes the assumption of uniform resource distribution, incorporating a spatial dimension in fisheries dynamics analysis; and expounds basic elements of decision-making theory and criteria that reflect different attitudes to risk aversion in fisheries management. Contents: Chapter 1: Inherent Characteristics of Fish Stocks, (1) Optimal Allocation of Renewable Resources: Basic Assumptions, (2) The Failure in the Optimal Allocation of Fishery Resources, (3) Fisheries Management Plans, (4) A Closing Comment, Chapter 2: Bioeconomic Models, (1) The Gordon-Schaefer Model, (2) Fleet Dynamics: A Distributed-Delay Smith s Model, (3) Yield-Mortality Models: A Bioeconomic Approach, (4) Age-Structured Bioeconomic Models, (5) Intertemporal Fisheries Analysis, Chaper 3: Ecological and Technological Interdependencies, (1) Technological Interdependencies: Heterogenous Fishing Effort, (2) Technologically Interdependent Fisheries: Two Fleets, (3) Technological Interdependencies: Sequential Fisheries, (4) Bioeconomics of Ecologically Interdependent Stocks, (5) Techno-Ecological Interdependencies, (6) Multispecies Fisheries and Experimental Management, Chapter 4: The System Science Approach in Fisheries Bioeconomics, (1) The System Simulation Approach, (2) A Numerical Example, Chapter 5: Management, (1) State Intervention Criteria, (2) Management Strategies, (3) Multiple Criteria Optimization Approach for Fisheries Management, Chapter 6: Spatial Bioeconomic Models, (1) Spatial Allocation of Fishing Intensite, (2) Short-Run Spatial Dynamics: ALLOC Model, (3) Short and Long-Run Geographic Bioeconomic Dynamics: CHART Model, (4) A Spatial Bioeconomic Model for Sedentary Fisheries: The Yellow Clam Mesodesma mactroides of Uruguay, a Study Case, Chapter 7: Risk and Uncertainty: A Precautionary Approach, (1) Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management, (2) Sources of Uncertainty in Fisheries, (3) Management Decisions without Mathematical Probabilities, (4) Management Decisions with Mathematical Probabilities, (5) Estimation of Uncertainty in Model Parameters.

Fishery policies are broadly debated in the Nordic countries, focusing on balancing biological concern of fish stocks, economic return to society and coastal communities’ interests. Market Based Fisheries Management is used in several Nordic countries today and is the core of these debates. While it by many is considered a powerful tool that works towards ensuring improved economy of fisheries, it is also considered a controversial tool. This report “Structural Adjustment and Regulation of Nordic Fisheries until 2025” document the effects of Marked Based Management of selected Nordic fisheries, forecast the structural development of these until 2025 under the current alternative fishery management. Nordic lessons on Market Based Fisheries Management are also provided as a basis for the political debate on the future of Nordic Fisheries.

The genesis of this conference was on a quay of the port of Bergen in March 1985. Ragnar Amason suggested to Phil Neher a small, mid-Atlantic conference on recent developments in fishery management. In the event, more than twenty papers were scheduled and over one hundred and fifty conferees were registered. Logistical complications were sorted through for a summer 1988 conference in Iceland. The really innovative management programs were in the South Pacific; Aus tralia and New Zealand had introduced Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs); and Iceland, Norway and Canada were also experimenting with quotas. It seemed to the program committee (Rognvaldur Hannesson and Geoffrey Waugh were soon on board) that these quotas had more or less characteristics of property rights. Property rights were also taking other forms in other places (time and area licenses, restrictive licensing of vessels and gear, traditional use rights). The idea of rights based fishing became the theme of the conference.

Few doubt the impact from human activities on global warming and the negative consequences of rising temperatures for both terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Efficient policy instruments are needed to change the development. This report uses empirical models to analyse how CO2 emissions, fleet structure, economic performance, and employment opportunities are affected by imposing management instruments to reduce climate impacts. These instruments include both fisheries management such as larger stock levels and more efficient fleets, and energy policy such as fuel taxes or CO2 trading schemes. To get a representative view of the Nordic fisheries, the analysis contains case studies from all the Nordic countries: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Finland. The fleet segments analysed range from coastal small-scale trap nets to large off-shore trawlers.

In this monograph, Professor Gissurarson explains the Icelandic model of fisheries management, Individual Transferable Share Quotas (ITQs), implemented in 1979 to reverse the decline in Icelandic fish stocks. Access to Icelandic fisheries was traditionally open to all. In the 1960s and 1970s excessive catches of herring and then cod led to a decline in stocks of these important species in Iceland's waters. In response, Iceland's government imposed restrictions on the number of days trawlers could put to sea to catch certain species. This led to fishing Derbies, where fishermen competed to catch as many fish as possible in the limited time available. Inevitably, catches continued to exceed sustainable levels. Starting in 1979, the Icelandic government gradually introduced a system of individual transferable share quotas (ITQs), which essentially give boat owners the right to catch a specific proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC) of certain species. If a boat owner does not wish to use all his ITQ he can sell part of it to someone else. This encourages more efficient use of the capital invested in boats and equipment. Because ITQs entitle their owners to a specific share of the future stock of fish, they create incentives to ensure that stocks are sustainable. Since the introduction of ITQs, capital invested in Icelandic fisheries (boats and equipment) has been gradually falling and catches have fallen to sustainable levels, whilst the value of catches has risen. Because of the success of the ITQ system and the wealth it has created, there is now political pressure for an imposition of a resource rent tax. But such a tax would be contrary to the interests of effective conservation of fish stocks. A more appropriate next step would be to introduce a cost-recovery charge and, as a quid pro quo, give ITQ owners greater say in the administration and enforcement of the system. Owners of ITQ would have stronger incentives to ensure that catch levels were set at the economically optimal level.