Since India declared itself a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, its nuclear capabilities have grown significantly. India is now on the verge of acquiring a triad of nuclear delivery systems. Its increasing nuclear profile has also stirred a debate on its stated nuclear doctrine involving principles of no-first use and massive retaliation. This Letort Paper examines changes in India's nuclear trajectory, the accompanying doctrinal debate, and its nonproliferation policies in the backdrop of the current regional and international context. The implications of this for the United States and its policy in the Asia-Pacific region are also discussed.

As India rises in the international system, its foreign and defense policies are attaining greater influence in shaping global security. This Letort Paper explores Indian nuclear policy approaches and views, and makes a major contribution to our understanding of this factor of growing significance in Asian security. India's nuclear arsenal development is generating new technical options for its nuclear strategy. India is developing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-range Agni-V and Agni-VI ballistic missiles, and is claiming that these will be able to host multiple nuclear warheads. It is also building a new generation of short-range and potentially nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and fielding an indigenous naval nuclear force. However, as these advancements interact with those of India's strategic rivals, China and Pakistan, they threaten to blur nuclear thresholds and elevate the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation due to misperception.

"India's growing and diversifying nuclear force raises challenges for its defense planners. New nuclear options need to be located within a holistic view of India's defense approach, with clearly assigned roles for conventional and nuclear forces dependent on the threats posed. This also generates issues for U.S. defense planners. The current U.S. policy is to energetically assist the defense projection of India so as to help complicate the rise of China. This focus has an underlying assumption that the United States and India do not militarily threaten each other. This framing could potentially lead to an overlook or downplay of the potential negative effects from Indian nuclear force developments -- and their related strategic interactions with Pakistan and China -- in terms of the risk they pose to U.S. interests. In reality, the nature and domains of trilateral India-Pakistan-China nuclear and conventional competition are rapidly shifting, and close assessment of their potential effects is merited by the growing deployment of U.S. forces to the region. This Letort Paper makes four main policy recommendations, directed to Washington and/or New Delhi"--Page xiii.

"This book brings together the many pieces of India's nuclear puzzle and the ramifications for South Asia. The author examines the choices facing India from New Delhi's point of view in order to discern which future courses of action appear most appealing to Indian security managers. He details how such choices, if acted upon, would affect U.S. strategic interests, India's neighbors, and the world."--BOOK JACKET.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country’s nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions. Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.