"This book brings together the many pieces of India's nuclear puzzle and the ramifications for South Asia. The author examines the choices facing India from New Delhi's point of view in order to discern which future courses of action appear most appealing to Indian security managers. He details how such choices, if acted upon, would affect U.S. strategic interests, India's neighbors, and the world."--BOOK JACKET.

Based on the author's thesis (Ph. D.--Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991) under title: Indian nuclear strategy.

This book examines the Indian nuclear policy, doctrine, strategy and posture, clarifying the elastic concept of credible minimum deterrence at the center of the country's approach to nuclear security. This concept, Karnad demonstrates, permits the Indian nuclear forces to be beefed up, size and quality-wise, and to acquire strategic reach and clout, even as the qualifier minimum suggests an overarching concern for moderation and economical use of resources, and strengthens India's claims to be a responsible nuclear weapon state. Based on interviews with Indian political leaders, nuclear scientists, and military and civilian nuclear policy planners, it provides unique insights into the workings of India's nuclear decision-making and deterrence system. Moreover, by juxtaposing the Indian nuclear policy and thinking against the theories of nuclear war and strategic deterrence, nuclear escalation, and nuclear coercion, offers a strong theoretical grounding for the Indian approach to nuclear war and peace, nuclear deterrence and escalation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and to limited war in a nuclearized environment. It refutes the alarmist notions about a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia, etc. which derive from stereotyped analysis of India-Pakistan wars, and examines India's likely conflict scenarios involving China and, minorly, Pakistan.

In this book, the leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. Basrur shows that the country's nuclear culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence but sometimes drifts into a more open-ended view.

Speaking in Delhi in November 2016, Manohar Parrikar, India's then Defence Minister, said there should be an element of unpredictability in the country's military strategy. He wondered whether India's nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a 'no-first-use' posture. The essence of the defence minister's introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several nuclear strategists. Nuclear doctrines are not written in stone and are never absolutely rigid. They are not binding international treaties that must be adhered to in letter and spirit. Fifteen years have passed since India's nuclear doctrine was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January 2003. A review of the nuclear doctrine is long overdue. Credible minimum deterrence and the posture of no-first-use have stood the test of time. But is there no conceivable operational contingency that justifies a first strike? Do we need a new nuclear policy for our new geopolitical reality? This book delves into the debate and charts out a way ahead.

At A Time When The World Is Rife With Speculation About India S Nuclear Programme, India S Nuclear Doctrine Presents An Informed And Lucid Account Of The Country S Nuclear Policy Since 1948, Through Pokharan I And Pokharan Ii.The Author Argues Effectively That While Remaining Committed To Its Advocacy Of Complete Nuclear Disbarment, India Is Only Too Aware Of Its Need To Maintain Nuclear Deterrence So Long As Weapons Of This Nature Remain With The Other Nuclear Powers. World Peace, However, Is India S Priority And The Author Makes A Dynamic Case For The Claim That He Weapons Of Nuclear India Are No Threat To International Peace And Security.

Conflict resolution and promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia has assumed a new urgency in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and underlined by the outbreak of fighting in Kargil in 1999, full mobilization on the border during most of 2002, and continued low-intensity warfare and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The stability of nuclear deterrence between the two countries is therefore a matter of great urgency and has found a place on the scholarly agenda of security studies in South Asia. Several books have been written on India’s nuclear programme, but these have been mostly analytical histories. The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship is a new departure in that it is the first time that a group of scholars from the South Asian subcontinent have collectively tried to apply deterrence theory and international relations theory to South Asia.