'Governing power' is a pioneering attempt to examine the experience with independent regulation of electricity in India to assess its efficacy as an alternative form of governance. It compares the electricity experience with that of independent regulation in the other countries, independent regulatory bodies in India, and old-style regulation by government departments. It evaluates the Indian model in context of its replication over other sectors of the economy. S L Rao's experience of having operationalized the concept in India, as the first Chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, provides valuable insights. This book epitomizes the multidisciplinary expertise (linking economics, management, financial and cost accounting, and engineering) that electricity regulatory commissions must harness to effectively regulate the sector, despite high government ownership, strong utility'government linkages, inefficiencies, and weak commercial attitudes. The book tracks the emergence of regulatory law from the orders of regulatory bodies and courts; explores the concept of ?independence? and discusses the accountability of independent regulators (an issue not sufficiently explored till now); and suggests directions for future development of independent regulation. Governing power is relevant to any environment where independent regulation is introduced, more so in developing economies or where government ownership is dominant. It is extremely relevant to utilities (private and public), regulators, courts, professional managers, accountants, and consultants. It will benefit anyone interested in enhancing the quality of governance.

This report identifies the critical points where undue influence can be exercised at different moments in the life of a regulator and discusses some of the avenues for developing a culture of independence, including through interactions with stakeholders, staffing and financing.

For developing countries, a stable and secure supply of electricity is crucial for development, and for their populations' well-being. Since the early 1990s, the main mechanism for constructing power generation facilities in developing countries has been the independent power project (IPP) model, where a foreign investor enters into long term investment contracts with the national utility. This model has succeeded in attracting investment, but raises complex regulatory and contractual challenges in addition to public concerns. This book - drawing on project contracts, the author's interview sources, case law and literature - analyzes in detail the legal investment protection used by IPP investors to ensure sufficient returns and protect their contracted revenue stream. The author examines how the model's corporate / financial structure interlocks with strong contractual rights and with a number of measures used to improve the host country's creditworthiness in the short and long term (including investment guarantees).The second part of the book identifies that the IPP model normally leads to six main consequences for the host developing country: The IPP model has led to private investment, which has increases reliability, modernization and introduced private standards; It contains an intrinsic structural weakness in times of economic downturns; It has shown a tendency to lead to overinvestment in generation capacity; It has shown a tendency to lead to expensive and suboptimal solutions regarding choice of design and technology; The model (and its institutional surroundings) contains insufficient disincentives against moral hazard and exploitative behavior (including corruption); and The IPP model does not facilitate a further development of the host country's power sector. The author argues that these consequences for development can be improved without detrimentally compromising the private sector's willingness to continue to invest. While pursuing this analysis, the author also explores such issues as the following: ; the web of parties and contracts constituting the IPP model, including the model's risk allocation; an analysis of political risk, including to what extent foreign investors also are protected against commercial and credit risks; the competing needs of predictability and flexibility in long term contracts; how investment arbitration tribunals have reacted both to the change in macroeconomic circumstances caused by the East Asian Crisis of 1997-98, and to numerable and credible allegations of corruption during procurement identification of factors reducing, or increasing, the IPP model's tendency to fail during severe economic recessions

The reform of the electricity supply industry is gathering pace in many countries. Independent regulatory agencies and other regulatory bodies have been created, and regulatory responsibilities redefined. This book reviews the evolving institutional structures to regulate the electricity supply industry in IEA member countries.

During the 1990s, a new paradigm for power sector reform was put forward emphasizing the restructuring of utilities, the creation of regulators, the participation of the private sector, and the establishment of competitive power markets. Twenty-five years later, only a handful of developing countries have fully implemented these Washington Consensus policies. Across the developing world, reforms were adopted rather selectively, resulting in a hybrid model, in which elements of market orientation coexist with continued state dominance of the sector. This book aims to revisit and refresh thinking on power sector reform approaches for developing countries. The approach relies heavily on evidence from the past, drawing both on broad global trends and deep case material from 15 developing countries. It is also forward looking, considering the implications of new social and environmental policy goals, as well as the emerging technological disruptions. A nuanced picture emerges. Although regulation has been widely adopted, practice often falls well short of theory, and cost recovery remains an elusive goal. The private sector has financed a substantial expansion of generation capacity; yet, its contribution to power distribution has been much more limited, with efficiency levels that can sometimes be matched by well-governed public utilities. Restructuring and liberalization have been beneficial in a handful of larger middle-income nations but have proved too complex for most countries to implement. Based on these findings, the report points to three major policy implications. First, reform efforts need to be shaped by the political and economic context of the country. The 1990s reform model was most successful in countries that had reached certain minimum conditions of power sector development and offered a supportive political environment. Second, countries found alternative institutional pathways to achieving good power sector outcomes, making a case for greater pluralism. Among the top performers, some pursued the full set of market-oriented reforms, while others retained a more important role for the state. Third, reform efforts should be driven and tailored to desired policy outcomes and less preoccupied with following a predetermined process, particularly since the twenty-first-century century agenda has added decarbonization and universal access to power sector outcomes. The Washington Consensus reforms, while supportive of the twenty-first-century century agenda, will not be able to deliver on them alone and will require complementary policy measures

This paper evaluates the effects of the establishment of an Independent Regulatory Authority (IRA) on electricity sector performance in developing countries. The study assesses the impact of such reform on electricity generated, technical quality of the service and country energy efficiency. Double-Difference and Matching are used to address sources of selection bias in identifying impacts; our empirical approach utilizes the panel structure of the data to control for time-invariant unobservables at the country level by applying propensity-score-matched double difference comparison.Our results suggest that introducing Independent Regulation in the electricity industry is effective in stimulating performance improvements: this lead to more generated electricity and better technical quality of the service. The impact on energy efficiency is positive but insignificant. The methodological lesson from this paper is that robust estimation of public reform is possible even in the absence of proper baseline survey.