Seminar paper from the year 2010 in the subject Law - Comparative Legal Systems, Comparative Law, grade: A+, Vanderbilt University (Law School), language: English, abstract: The “independent director” has become a centerpiece of modern corporate governance. However, the concept of “independence”, and the ability of independent directors to fulfill their roles, remains deeply problematical. In the course of the discussion on the proper role of independent directors that unfolded in Europe and the United States during the 1980s and 1990s and peaked in the wake of the Enron scandal, rules on director independence have found their way to the corporate governance regimes of developing countries that turned their head to western economies. Particularly in China and India, independent directors have taken their place on company boards, earning mixed responses from the academic and business community. What is the current state of Indian and Chinese rules on director independence? What tensions do they address and create? And what can be done to optimize the achievement of their objectives? The goal of this article is to examine the status quo of director independence in the two countries, to put the regulations into their historic and political context, to summarize practical experiences with the new institution, and to point to possible future developments.

Corporate governance (gongsi zhili) is a concept whose time has come in China, and the institution of the independent director is a major part of this concept. Policymakers in several countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan have turned to independent directors as an important element of legal and policy reform in the field of corporate governance. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued its Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies. Covering all companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges (but not Chinese companies listed overseas), it constitutes the most comprehensive measure taken to date by the CSRC - or indeed by any Chinese governmental authority - to regulate internal corporate governance through the institution of the independent director. This article discusses the institution of independent directors, and the Independent Director Opinion specifically, as a potential solution to Chinese corporate governance problems. It begins by discussing special features of the Chinese corporate landscape and the most prominent problems in the area of corporate governance. It then proceeds to identify differing conceptions of what is broadly termed the independent director - the outside director, the disinterested director, and the (more narrowly defined) independent director - and discusses the approaches taken in several different jurisdictions. The article canvasses empirical research on the relationship between independent directors and corporate performance in the United States, as well as in China, and finds that the research yields similar conclusions: there is no strong link. The article concludes by arguing that proponents of the institution of independent directors misconceive the nature of the corporate governance problem in China, as well as the functioning of independent directors in the United States, and have not taken into account specific features of the Chinese institutional environment - particularly the legal environment - that affect the viability of any proposed solution.

China is an increasingly influential emerging economy that is currently attracting the attention of academics, practitioners, and policy makers. This book is a collection of cutting edge research findings on issues relating to the experiences and challenges of China's capital market development.

Traditional tests to determine the independence of members of the board present an effort to establish independence by showing that the independent director can go about his duties without being beholden to the company in some manner, whether by pecuniary interest or by family or social relationships with other members of the company. But these tests assume that the corporation is situated in a certain legal and political environment where independent director functions are supported by other aspects of society and by law. This act of situating the company in such an environment makes many assumptions that cannot be safely made when evaluating the question of director independence in various foreign jurisdictions. From studying the legal background of the implementation of the independent director system in China, our answer to the question of whether independence is possible is a “yes” with a large “but.” Independence is possible if a political and legal environment nurtures the independent director and allows him to act in order to fulfill his tasks. Such an environment should first, place directors in the dominant position in the corporate organizational structure as the ultimate repository of the managerial powers in the corporation. Second, the securities market of the country should be mature enough to allow for the possibility of competing shareholder groups to be present within the corporation. Third, the corporation must be free to pursue profit maximization as its ultimate goal. Fourth, a strong and independent judiciary should be present that will equitably decide on lawsuits that may be filed to vindicate shareholder or director abuses. Lastly, the responsibilities for policing corporate action must be properly organized such that independent directors can proceed with their task knowing that they will be the ones ultimately responsible.

This paper explores the empirical results of the implementation of an independent director system in China. The results show that firms implement board independence by adding extra members, instead of removing inside directors, except in the case where the board size (before the recruitment of independent directors) has already been too large. It has been identified that large firms prefer a large board with more independent directors on the board. However, the largest shareholders have a strong incentive to organise a small and insider-controlled board. Although there is a negative relationship between board size, board independence and firm performance, Tobin's Q increases in relation to board size and board independence for large firms.